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FANNIE MAE/FREDDIE MAC HOME MORTGAGE
DOCUMENTS INTERPRETED AS NONRECOURSE DEBT (WITH
POETIC COMMENTS LIFTED FROM CARL SANDBURG)
JOHN MIXON*
I. LAWYERS (BUT NOT HOME MORTGAGE BORROWERS) KNOW THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RECOURSE AND NONRECOURSE DEBT
The Lawyers, Bob, know too much.
They are chums of the books of old John Marshall.
They know it all, what a dead hand wrote,
A stiff dead hand and its knuckles crumbling,
The bones of the fingers a thin white ash.
The lawyers know
a dead man's thought too well.'
Lawyers know there are two types of mortgage obligations:
recourse and nonrecourse. 2 Recourse promissory notes impose
* Law Alumni Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author
thanks Lauren E. Schroeder, Reference/Research Librarian at the Law Center;
student research assistant Karen Gross; Houston real estate attorneys Kim Yelton,
Charles Jacobus, and Marvin Nathan; Law Center Professors Aaron Bruhl, Richard
Dole, Barbara Evans, Julie Hill, and Ron Turner; and a number of real estate and
lending professionals who provided information that was used, at their request,
without attribution. The author acknowledges the research method described in
GEORGE LEFCOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW 713 (1974), "[i]nformed gossip, the
chief empirical tool of lawyers, legislators and law professors."
1. CARL SANDBURG, The Lawyers Know Too Much, in SMOKE AND STEEL 85,
85 (1920).
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personal liability on borrowers for the total amount borrowed.3 The
mortgage pledges the land (for present purposes, a personal residence)
as security.4 If the borrower defaults, the lender can foreclose, have
the land sold, and apply the proceeds to reduce the debt. 5 But the note
obliges the borrower to repay the borrowed amount in full and he or
she is personally liable for deficiency if foreclosure sale proceeds do
not satisfy the debt.6 The deficiency can be reduced to judgment and
recorded in county records, where it hovers over the debtor for ten or
more years.7 The judgment has the practical effect of disabling the
debtor from participating in the normal credit market, authorizing
seizure and sale of all non-exempt assets, 8 and, where allowed,
subjecting wages to garnishment. 9
Nonrecourse obligations also pledge the land, which can be sold
at foreclosure and its proceeds applied to the debt, but, in contrast,
impose no personal liability for deficiency after foreclosure except
claims for waste and foreclosure costs.' 0 Nonrecourse obligations (and
2. See generally Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Inland Indus., Inc., 869 F.
Supp. 99 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding a mortgage note nonrecourse); Gregory M. Stein,
The Scope of the Borrower's Liability in a Nonrecourse Real Estate Loan, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1207 (1998) (describing and comparing nonrecourse debt as
to deficiency and liability for other charges, such as waste and cost of foreclosure); 1
GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 2.1 (5th ed.
2007) (discussing recourse and nonrecourse liability). The distinction is very
important in income tax treatment of foreclosures. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1001-2(4) (2008).
3. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.1.
4. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 1.1. The note is drafted to refer to, but
not to incorporate, the mortgage by reference. Incorporation would impair
negotiability of the note and deprive secondary market purchasers of holder in due
course protection. See Hinckley v. Eggers, 587 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App. 1979);
United Nat'l Bank of Miami v. Airport Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 537 So. 2d 608 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1988); U.C.C. §§ 3-104(a)(1), 3-105(b) (2000).
5. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.1.
6. Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 cmt. a (1997).
7. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.5 (West 2006) (setting a ten year
limitation on judgments).
8. 33 C.J.S. Executions § 25 (2008).
9. See Calderock Joint Ventures, L.P. v. Mitiku, 848 N.Y.S.2d 36, 36 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2007); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 450
S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
10. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, §§ 8.1, 2.1. Nonrecourse does not
necessarily mean that the borrower is totally free from liability for some costs of
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limited recourse obligations) are common in commercial transactions,
but not in home purchase mortgage transactions.'
Virtually all home purchase mortgage lenders use standard
documents that are commonly thought to impose recourse liability on
home purchase mortgagors 12 except where limited or excluded by
state law. 13
A. Recourse Mortgage Notes Assign the Formal Risk of Market
Decline to Borrowers
When the lawyers are through
What is there left, Bob?
Can a mouse nibble at it
And find enough to fasten a tooth in?
14
foreclosure, such as court costs, attorney fees, and property devaluation from waste.
See Stein, supra note 2, at 1207 (describing obligations that may be imposed on
nonrecourse obligors for waste, cost of foreclosure, and so on).
11. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, §2.1. A distinction is made between
purchase money mortgages, which are the primary subject of this article, and equity
mortgages. Home equity mortgage lending is specially regulated by the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See Laurie A. Burlingame, A Pro-
Consumer Approach to Predatory Lending: Enhanced Protection Through Federal
Legislation and New Approaches to Education, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 460,
460 (2006) (recommending federal legislation and consumer education programs to
counter predatory lending practices).
12. This article focuses on home purchase mortgages, but parts of it can apply
as well to equity mortgages, particularly on personal residences.
13. For example, Houston real estate developers during the 1970s and 1980s
sometimes undertook personal liability for a percentage of the debt, but not for the
entire obligation, e.g., $5,000,000 personal recourse on a $50,000,000 note. Marvin
Nathan, a Houston real estate lawyer for more than thirty years, stated: "Many deeds
of trust used in commercial transactions involving much more knowledgeable
borrowers contain ... express exculpatory clauses excusing the borrowers from
personal liability except for ... fraud, misapplication of rents, condemnation
awards, insurance proceeds, etc." E-mail from Marvin D. Nathan, Shareholder &
Attorney, Nathan, Sommers, Jacobs, Corp., to John Mixon (Jan. 24, 2008, 12:17
CST) (on file with author).
14. SANDBURG, supra note 1, at 85.
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The matter of deficiencies after foreclosure is important. A
congressional report estimates that subprime mortgages alone will
generate two million foreclosures. 5 House values in some parts of the
United States have dropped dramatically, and many distressed owners
find it virtually impossible to sell at prices anywhere near their
mortgage debt. 6 If two million foreclosures produce an average of
twenty thousand dollars deficiency each, the lingering liability could
total forty billion dollars. Even if actual judgments or collection
efforts reach only one-tenth of that amount, 17 four billion dollars is
still a big hit on that part of society that has just been through financial
disaster and is least able to pay. Moreover, the liability is formal, but
not real. The borrowers will not pay because they have few, if any,
assets to attach in satisfaction of the judgment. The only recovery in
most cases will be the pittance professional bill collectors extract.
The subprime meltdown has illustrated an indisputable fact: home
mortgage lenders and secondary market purchasers, not borrowers,
bear the unassignable cost of a market crash in real estate. It is
appropriate that they do. As allies and enablers of the professional
housing industry, lenders advertise their services, promote the values
of home ownership, and create an image that they know what they are
doing and that they are worthy of trust. 18 Their profit comes from
15. SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER & REP. CAROLYN B. MALONEY, JOINT
ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT ON WEALTH, PROPERTY VALUES AND TAX REVENUES, AND How WE GOT
HERE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 1 (Oct. 2007), http://jec.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuse
Action=Reports.Reports&ContentRecordid=C6627BB2-7E9C-9AF9-7AC7-32B94
D398D27 (follow the "The Subprime Lending Crisis" hyperlink) ("For the period
beginning in the first quarter of 2007 and extending through the final quarter of
2009, if housing prices continue to decline, we estimate that subprime foreclosures
alone will total approximately 2 million.").
16. See, e.g., Michael M. Grynbaum, Home Prices Sank in 2007, and Buyers
Hid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2008, at C5; Les Christie, Double-Digit Home Price
Drops Coming, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 19, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/
2007/09/19/realestate/steep-home-price-dropsscoming/index.htm (warning of a
twenty-five percent drop in Stockton, California).
17. Not all foreclosures will produce deficiencies. Some will be subject to state
limitations on deficiency. Some lenders will not pursue deficiencies for economic
reasons.
18. See Louise Story, No Lull in Mortgage Pitches, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008,
at C1. For example, "Bank of America says 'Homeownership is the best medicine.'
[Vol. 45
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lending to borrowers who know little about the details of land finance.
Lenders, not borrowers, make the biggest investment when they
provide up to 100% of the home purchase price. When the housing
market goes up, 19 lenders and housing providers profit by lending
more money and selling more houses. When the market goes down,
mortgages go into default, foreclosures occur, and lenders and housing
providers lose.
Lenders cannot really shift foreclosure losses to borrowers
because borrowers, as a class, do not have the financial capability to
bear them. In a general economic decline, borrowers lose their down
payments, good credit histories, and the security of the places they
live. Deficiency judgments and aggressive debt collection after
foreclosure do not transfer that loss; they make the loss greater.
Deficiency exposure after home mortgage foreclosure is haphazard. a
Some mortgage lenders forgo pursuit of deficiency because judgments
are not worth the hassle. 21 The Federal Housing Administration
Also, the National Association of Realtors is running national television ads saying
there has never been a better time to buy a home." Id.
19. See James Grant, Op-Ed., Paying the Price for the Fed's Success, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at 16 (commenting on the tendency of "profit-seeking people
to take on more financial risk" and to lend and borrow more when the economy is
stable). Until recently, the U.S. economy has enjoyed a relatively peaceful and
stable period. Id. But, this stability led to risky behavior, which has proven to be
dangerous in today's market. Id. Housing providers and lenders may also suffer
from consumer reluctance to enter the housing market that carries a downside of
lingering liability after foreclosure. An Associated Press-AOL poll shows that a
majority of potential buyers are reluctant to enter the market for fear that prices will
continue to fall. See Majority Not Buying Homes, Poll Shows, CNNMONEY.COM,
Apr. 14, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2OO8/04/14/realestate/housing-crisis.ap/
index.htm?postversion=2008041411.
20. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., PROVIDING ALTERNATIVES TO
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 126-27 (1996) (mentioning
deficiency judgments, but barely touching the downside of them). The benign report
focuses on protective legislation to prevent deficiency abuses, then shifts to an
allocation of risk of market decline. The report implies that deficiencies are used
against investors, repeat defaulters, and non-hardship cases, and states that
deficiencies are rarely pursued in practice. Id.
21. Texas lenders almost always employ deeds of trust that employ nonjudicial
foreclosure without redemption after sale. Local foreclosure specialists agreed that
few lenders today are pursuing claims to the point of deficiency judgments after
foreclosure. One law firm specializes in foreclosures and charges high volume
clients $500 to $750 to obtain (probably uncontested) deficiency judgments after
5
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(FHA)22 and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 23 have
policies of substantial forbearance and waiver of deficiencies. Freddie
Mac currently does not pursue collection on hardship homeowner
foreclosures, but it does pursue investors.24 Various private lenders
and private mortgage insurance companies pursue deficiencies
aggressively where not limited by state law. 25 While some states
deed of trust sale. A principal in that firm reports that, contrary to practices in the
1980s when lenders automatically pursued deficiency liability, many lenders now
bid the full debt plus attorneys' fees as a matter of course, eliminating deficiency
entirely. The reason given was that deficiencies create more hassle than they are
worth, taking into account the additional legal fees, potential bankruptcy filings, and
contested hearings on market value to determine the amount of deficiency.
Telephone Interview with Michael C. Barrett (Member) and Tommy Bastian
(Attorney), Barrett, Dafin, Frappier, Turner & Engel, LLP (Feb. 4, 2008) (Texas
attorneys specializing in foreclosures statewide).
22. FHA employs deficiency power against borrowers who commit fraud or
display excess assets. The Assistant General Counsel for the Single Family
Mortgage Division of FHA observed that if someone walked away from an FHA
insured house after winning the lottery, deficiency would likely be pursued. In a
case such as that posed in the survey of my class, there would likely be no action to
recover deficiency. Veterans Affairs, on the other hand, at least in the local area,
does not have organized collection procedures and seems to treat home purchase
obligations as functionally nonrecourse. Those who were simply caught in an
economic bind and have no excess assets are treated compassionately. Interview
with Assistant General Counsel, Single Family Mortgage Division of the FHA, in
Houston, Tex. (Feb. 6, 2008) (author promised confidentiality to interviewee).
23. Compassion may be involved in the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs'
policy of general forbearance from pursuing deficiencies on VA guaranteed loans.
One regional office does not even maintain a record of deficiencies as collectible
debt. The office must set up a debt account if a borrower wants to clear the default
and qualify for another loan. Interview with Veterans Affairs Representative, in
Houston, Tex. (Feb. 7, 2008) (author promised confidentiality to interviewee).
24. E-mail from Dean S. Cooper, Managing Associate General Counsel,
Freddie Mac, to John Mixon (Feb. 4, 2008, 16:09 CST) (on file with author).
Mortgage insurance companies have their own policies concerning deficiency
collection for Freddie Mac mortgages. Id.
25. A private mortgage insurance company lawyer indicated that his company
pursues deficiency judgments in about thirty-five states where borrowers are not
protected by local law. Telephone Interview with a Deficiency Collection Attorney,
in Houston, Tex. (Feb. 11, 2008) (author promised confidentiality to interviewee).
According to a Texas foreclosure specialist, an undetermined number of foreclosing
lenders bid seventy-five to eighty percent of the debt, but do not take the next step of
obtaining a deficiency judgment. Instead, they sell the unsatisfied claim at a deep
discount to a "vulture fund," a group that buys judgments at a deep discount and
[Vol. 45
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disable mortgage insurers from suing homeowners for deficiency, 26
other states prohibit home mortgage deficiencies entirely 27 or use
market value 28 instead of foreclosure bid to calculate loss. 2 9
Furthermore, some states provide time-consuming statutory
redemption after foreclosure that encourages lenders to forgo or
bargain away deficiency liability in exchange for speedy liquidation. 30
There seems to be no nationwide organizing principle to explain
industry practices that are applied haphazardly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, arbitrarily capturing one borrower in the deficiency net
while letting others go. That may be about to change. Subprime
then uses pressure tactics to collect whatever it can from the debtors. Automatic
pursuit of judgment would be more likely in states where judicial foreclosure is the
norm and the cost for entering a deficiency judgment is minimal. The prospect of
collecting is greater in states that protect few assets from levy and allow
garnishment of wages. Some judgments are automatically satisfied if the debtor
engages in a later real estate transaction in the county where the judgment is
recorded. Title insurance companies and mortgage lenders will require satisfaction
of outstanding judgments by debtors seeking to buy or sell real estate. Telephone
Interview with Michael C. Barrett, Bastian Law Firm, in Houston, Tex. (Feb. 13,
2008).
26. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 6503(g) (Consol. 2006); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §
3502.106 (2007). New York law provides that "a mortgage insurer may not obtain a
deficiency judgment against a borrower in the event of foreclosure." N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 6503(g) (Consol. 2006). Texas law prohibits provisions that allow "subrogation
rights or any other claim by the insurer against the borrower for a deficiency arising
from a foreclosure sale of a single-family dwelling that is occupied by the borrower
as the borrower's principal residence." TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 3502.106 (2007).
27. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (2006) (shielding purchase
money borrowers from deficiency after foreclosure).
28. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (2007). Adopted after the real
estate crash of the 1980s, Texas Property Code section 51.003 enables foreclosed
borrowers to prove fair market value of land sold at foreclosure instead of the sale
price as a credit against debt. Id. The statute was likely drafted for the benefit of
land developers and investors, not home mortgagors. They primarily benefit those
borrowers who are knowledgeable and have the financial resources to pursue
judicial action.
29. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.3 (listing California, Idaho,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Washington, Utah, and Georgia as providing significant homeowner protection).
30. One of the specialists interviewed said that when state law provides
statutory redemption after foreclosure, the lender may bargain with the borrower for
a voluntary release of redemption in exchange for immunity from deficiency. See
Deficiency Collection Attorney, supra note 25.
7
Mixon: Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Home Mortgage Documents Interpreted as Non
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
failures may soon override lenders' current tendency to forbear in
particular markets. When banks and mortgage insurance companies
begin to fail, receivers and trustees will pursue all assets available to
the failed institution, including deficiencies after foreclosure of home
mortgage notes.31
There is a reasonable way to eliminate the haphazard application
and magnification of inevitable deficiency loss: insulate home
mortgage borrowers from deficiencies after foreclosure by reading
mortgage documents anew and interpreting them as nonrecourse. This
interpretation is based on a fundamental contract principle: contract
obligation is based on consent.32 If borrowers have not consented to
lingering liability after foreclosure, then it should not be imposed.
B. Home Mortgage Borrowers Do Not Understand Recourse Liability
and Deficiency After Foreclosure
In the heels of the higgling lawyers, Bob,
Too many slippery ifs and buts and howevers,
Too mueh hereinbefore provided whereas
Too many doors to go in and out of33
I begin with an outright declaration that virtually no home
mortgage borrower who has not had (1) extensive professional
training, or (2) prior experience as a foreclosed borrower, understands
that home mortgages include the potential of a hovering judgment lien
after foreclosure. This lack of understanding makes any pretense of
consent pure rationalization. Law acts in complicity with lenders to
31. New pressure to collect on any available asset may come from
nontraditional real estate entities, such as a "credit swaps market" involved in
insuring credit obligations. See Gretchen Morgenson, Arcane Market Is Next to Face
Big Credit Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at Al.
32. The word "consent" is used here in a non-technical sense to distinguish
contract obligation from obligation based on status. The technical term for consent
for the purpose of contract liability is "manifestation of assent." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981) ("An agreement is a manifestation of mutual
assent on the part of two or more persons.").
33. SANDBURG, supra note 1, at 85.
[Vol. 45
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commit virtual fraud when it imposes this consequence on home
buyers without full disclosure and real, intelligent consent. 34
Most people understand that if they do not repay money borrowed
to buy a refrigerator, car, house, or any other consumer good, the
creditor will "repossess" the property and their credit will suffer. But a
limited survey of friends and acquaintances, all college and
professional school graduates, revealed that only the lawyers among
them understood the potential for deficiency judgments after
foreclosure, even though all were home owners. 35 This discovery
prompted me to do a more formal survey of an evening section of
third-semester law students to see whether my hypothesis was
correct.
36
34. For a description of the role of intent in a related area, the extension of
negotiable instrument law and liability to persons other than merchants, see Kurt
Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form Over Intent
in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 363, 381 (2002). "[I]nitially,
bills of exchange were considered a part of a merchant's business, a specialized art
for the businessperson, and alien to the life of the non-merchant. The binding legal
effect of negotiability was limited, at least theoretically, to those few likely to
understand the effects of negotiability." Id.
35. The informal and formal surveys included additional information that
income tax law treats cancelled debt, whether by voluntary act or running of the
statute of limitations, as ordinary income. For example, if the bid at foreclosure is
$30,000 less than the debt, the borrower must either pay the deficiency or report the
$30,000 as income if and when it is voluntarily released or becomes uncollectible by
the statute of limitations. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(12), 108 (West 2008). The potential
income tax liability following home mortgage foreclosure came as a complete
surprise to virtually all of the lay people surveyed and interviewed. If the debt is
nonrecourse, income from debt cancellation would not apply. See John Mixon and
Ira B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relief for Foreclosed Homeowners: ULSIA Section
511(b), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 455, 467-69 (1992). For most home mortgage
foreclosures, this income tax treatment was suspended by the Mortgage Forgiveness
Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142, 121 Stat. 1803 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.). The suspension was extended to January 1, 2013 by the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 303(a), 122
Stat. 3765 (2008).
36. After students responded to the questionnaires, I polled the class to see
what their backgrounds were. Thirty-two members of the class were homeowners,
with an average age of thirty years old. Six students had jobs that included banking
or some related professional field. Two class members learned about deficiency
liability from friends or family whose work or personal experience had taught them
about deficiencies. One student learned about deficiency judgments from research
9
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An open-ended questionnaire asked students to describe what they
thought would likely happen in three successive time periods if they
borrowed $200,000 to buy a house, but became disabled after one year
and could not make monthly payments. The primary purpose of the
question was to see whether answers indicated any general awareness
of lingering liability after foreclosure.
Only four of the forty-seven respondents clearly identified
continuing liability for deficiency as something they would connect
with foreclosure. Later inquiry revealed that six additional students
understood the prospect of deficiency liability, but did not think to
record it on the open-ended questionnaire. The remainder of the class
indicated they regarded the debt as satisfied by foreclosure, which
forty out of forty-seven identified as a likely event. Eighteen specified
that their credit would be harmed. What was surprising was that
twenty-seven students, more than half, identified personal bankruptcy
as an acceptable strategy to satisfy the debt. It is not clear what
necessity they thought would drive them to bankruptcy, but they were
clearly ready to take the cleansing bath.
A specific question asked whether the FHA or private mortgage
insurance would have any effect on their answers. Of twenty-eight
respondents, fifteen believed that mortgage insurance would protect
them from loss, 37 while thirteen understood that mortgage insurance
policies protect lenders, not borrowers. A second round of multiple-
choice questions reinforced that deficiency liability did not come into
their contemplation.38
on the Internet. These nine respondents claimed to understand recourse debt and
probably accounted for all of the unambiguously correct answers.
37. Students may, however, have intuited the operation of the Texas statute
prohibiting mortgage insurance companies from pursuing homeowners for
deficiencies. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 3502.106 (2007).
38. The second set posed true/false statements based on the same set of facts.
Only one alternative was clearly true: that the borrower would be exposed to ten
years of liability to seizure and sale of non-exempt assets. Only ten respondents
correctly selected the one correct deficiency judgment alternative. I infer, though
without proof, that this group included the six who had professional experience and
understood the lawspeak analysis and the four who had information from family or
friends with such knowledge. Twenty-four of the forty-seven multiple choice
questions contained an additional fact statement, namely that the borrower had
bought a policy of mortgage insurance as required by the lender, and a sixth
true/false statement that the mortgage insurer would make the mortgage payments so
[Vol. 45
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I concluded that my hypothesis was true: layspeakers, even those
who have bought houses and endured two semesters of law study, do
not understand the nature of recourse home mortgage debt and they do
not associate foreclosure with lingering liability; 39 lawspeakers, by
contrast, do. Lawyers understand that contract law treats parties
categorically either as competent or not competent. Unless underage
40
or mentally deficient,41 these supposedly autonomous, rational
borrowers are responsible for knowing or learning the content and
legal effect of even the most complex agreements they sign.42 Apart
from relieving defrauded parties from their contracts and providing
timid supervision of unconscionable contracts, law takes little account
for the fact that lenders are advised by professionals with perfect
information and perfect understanding of the content and legal
consequences of recourse mortgage debt. Furthermore, lenders
package nonnegotiable mortgage terms in complex, lengthy, and
intimidating documents that only a professional can understand.
How can the law hold borrowers to obligations they did not
understand, and that are not understood in the borrower's general
community? Do judges really think people consent to such liability by
signing mortgage documents, or is deficiency liability simply imposed
long as the borrower was disabled. Fifteen of the twenty-four respondents
erroneously thought mortgage insurance protected the homeowner.
39. But the students' views of reality are close to truth. In Texas, at least,
deficiency judgments following foreclosure are currently so rare as to be virtually
irrelevant. See supra notes 21, 25, and 26.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981); 5 RICHARD A. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:5 (4th ed. 1990).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 (1981); 5 RICHARD A. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 10:8 (4th ed. 1990). There is no claim that the home
mortgage borrowers under discussion in this paper are not fully competent in law.
The claim is that otherwise fully competent parties do not understand and do not
consent to lingering liability after foreclosure.
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) (1981) (assigning
the risk of mistake to a party who "is aware, at the time of contract, that he has only
limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats
his limited knowledge as sufficient"); James B. Hughes, Jr., Taking Personal
Responsibility: A Different View of Mortgage Antideficiency and Redemption
Statutes, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 117, 141 (1997) (advancing this view as a moral
imperative: "The relevant question is whether we have the moral backbone to hold
each competent adult responsible for the choices she makes").
11
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through raw and arbitrary power that instinctively, but unconsciously,
favors lenders?
C. Home Mortgage Borrowers Neither Consent Nor Manifest Consent
to Recourse Liability for Deficiency After Foreclosure
Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
Why does a hearse horse snicker
Hauling a lawyer away?43
As defined by common usage (and by the dictionary), assent
implies personal agreement after thoughtful consideration.44 But this
lay notion of subjective consent does not determine legal obligation.
Contract doctrine long ago adopted a rule that holds people to what
reasonable third parties would infer from their actions.45 This policy
protects the reliance interest of both contracting parties, who
obviously cannot see inside the heads of others and must therefore
respond to appearances of, or apparent, consent.
The "objective" theory of contract imposes obligation on parties
who manifest assent to a contract.46 The manifested assent rule tells us
that signing a mortgage and note implies consent to lingering
deficiency liability if an observer would infer that understanding from
the words in the documentation and the transaction itself.47 Here is
43. SANDBURG, supra note 1, at 85.
44. WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 69, 245 (3d ed. 2005) (defining
assent as derived from Latin roots "assentari: ad-, toward + sentire, to feel. To
express agreement : CONCUR. -n. 1. Agreement, as to a plan or proposal. 2.
Acquiescence : consent); Id. (defining consent as derived from Latin roots
"consentire, to agree : com-, together + sentire, to feel. 1. To give assent : AGREE.
2. Archaic. To be of the same mind or opinion.-n. 1. Voluntary allowance of what
is planned or done by another : PERMISSION. 2. Agreement and acceptance as to
opinion or a course of action").
45. See 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.12 (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) ("[T]hey are bound in accordance with the meaning that
reasonable third parties would give to their expressions without regard to the
meaning given by either of the parties themselves.").
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981).
47. See CORBIN, supra note 45.
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where law fudges. Law does not admit it, but the meaning (this time a
meaning constructed by the observer) is still subjective. A truly
"objective" observer would infer assent only if parties used language
that transcends (is common to) both the lay and legal community.
This is a language set of allspeak that contains both layspeak and
lawspeak. But if there is no allspeak, and lay observers and law
observers speak different languages; there is no single "objective"
interpretation or "meaning" that can be assigned to the manifestations.
The necessary conclusion is that, when we look for a hypothetical
observer, we find two types: lay observers and law observers. We
must choose one over the other to determine whether signing the note
and mortgage manifested assent to recourse obligation.
1. Lay Observers Interpret Home Mortgage Loans as Nonrecourse
The lay interpretation of the mortgage transaction would mirror
the lay community's understanding that home mortgagors assent to
"repossession" and credit score reduction if they cannot make their
payments, but not more. A lay observer therefore infers neither
consent nor manifested assent by a borrower to the hovering judgment
for deficiency after foreclosure. However, the issue cannot be so
simply dismissed because the legal system unquestionably holds
recourse debt mortgagors liable for deficiency, absent state law
restriction.
2. Law Imposes Recourse Obligation on Home Mortgage Borrowers
If the community interpretation of obligation is not authoritative,
does law impose deficiency liability by simple authoritarian will? Not
necessarily. An alternative assent analysis would hold that the lay
mortgagor blindly agreed to whatever law imposes if he or she
submits voluntarily to the transaction itself. But this analysis circles
back to whether the borrower assented to recourse debt, on the one
hand, or nonrecourse debt on the other. The legal consequences are
different for the two transactions. Thus, even by lawspeak, the inquiry
is led back to the different interpretations by lay and law observers.
Traditionally, lawspeak interprets the transaction and its
documentation as manifesting the borrower's assent to both
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foreclosure and deficiency, with the result that borrowers are bound
legally and, by some observers, even morally.48 This is fair enough if
the mortgagor is a member of the lawspeak community; for example,
a professional land developer who certainly knows the difference
between recourse and nonrecourse financing. But it is not at all clear
that the lawspeak interpretation should bind a lay mortgagor who is
not a member of that community.
49
3. Trade Usage Analogy Implies that Layspeak, not Lawspeak,
Should Govern Liability
To a lay mortgagor, liability imposed by lawspeak is as obscure
and unknowable as if it were a foreign language. In analogous
situations, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)50 and contract law51
acknowledge that words can have special trade meanings that bind
members of the trade, but not people outside the trade.52 This implies
that the meaning to be applied to the mortgage transaction should be
that of the community at large, and not the trade usage (lawspeak),
48. See, e.g., James B. Hughes, Taking Personal Responsibility: A Different
View of Mortgage Antideficiency and Redemption Statutes, 39 Apiz. L. REv. 117,
120-21, 141-43 (1997).
49. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981) (providing
special rules for standardized agreements, such as the mortgage documents: section
two favors interpreting such agreements as "treating alike all those similarly
situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of
the writing," and section three implies that if the lender has reason to believe the
borrower would not assent if he knew that the writing contained a particular term
(i.e., recourse liability), the term is not part of the agreement). Home mortgage
borrowers and lenders are not similarly situated, and the lender should know that the
borrower does not understand recourse liability. Whether the borrower would
nevertheless enter into the agreement is unknown for particular cases.
50. U.C.C. §§ 1-206, 2-208 (2004). The U.C.C. does not apply to real estate
transactions and real estate mortgages, only to the sale of goods. U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2-
105 (2004).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 220(1) (1981) (favoring
interpretation in accordance with a relevant usage if each party knew or had reason
to know of the usage and neither party knew or had reason to know that the meaning
attached by the other was inconsistent with the usage).
52. See, e.g., Flower City Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Constr. Co.,
591 F.2d 162, 164-65 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that a newcomer to the painting
business is not bound by a trade usage definition of "units").
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unless the borrower is a member of the lawspeak community. By
contrast, an investor who used home mortgage financing to buy
property to "flip" or rent has entered the lawspeak arena and can
reasonably be held to its interpretations.
4. Law Holds Lay Parties Responsible for Learning the Lawspeak
Meaning of Contract Terms
Lenders and lawyers have an answer to the trade usage analogy: if
the mortgagor does not totally understand all of the terms of the deal,
then he or she is responsible for seeking professional help to explain
them. 53 This assignment of responsibility assumes the mortgagor is an
autonomous, free will agent with reasoning power to comprehend not
only what he or she does not understand, but also that he or she does
not understand.
In reality, if a mortgagor asked a lawyer for representation in a
home mortgage transaction, the lawyer would check the closing
figures, check the interest rate, and look at the documents to see
whether they fit the standard practice forms. But not many real estate
lawyers would advise the client about the very basic fact of deficiency
liability in event of default.54
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) (1981) (stating that a
party bears the risk of a mistake when he is aware, at the time the contract is made,
that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake
relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient). This is a catch-22 if it is
applied to a party who does not realize that he or she does not understand.
54. Supported by an interview with a lawyer who has practiced real estate law
for thirty-five years, but has few home mortgage borrowing clients. He would not
spend much time beyond explaining the general mortgage terms, adjustable
mortgage hazards, the need to make payments, and so on. Telephone Interview with
Charles J. Jacobus, Real Estate Attorney, in Houston, Tex. (Mar. 5, 2008). Programs
for first-time home buyers also do not mention deficiency liability. See, e.g., U.S.
Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Buying a Home,
http://www.hud.gov/buying/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2008); First Time Home
Buyer Guide, http://first-time-home-buyer-s.comfirst-timehome-buyer-guide.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
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5. Law Wrongly Assumes People Act Autonomously
in an Objectivist World
The notion that mortgagors should understand the transaction well
enough to know when to seek expert advice assumes that both
borrowers and lenders function in an objectivist world of stable
categories of fact that can be comprehended by any observer.55 If such
a world does not exist, and if all human understanding is personal and
subjective, limited to what goes on inside individual brains, then the
underlying logic of that proposition crumbles. This article adopts the
latter assumptions, supported by current linguistic and brain science,
and rejects the objectivist position that knowledge of a stable,
coherent reality is accessible to everybody who looks.56 Even if the
standard for personal responsibility is expanded to include what is
known within the borrower's community, recourse liability on home
mortgage loans is still not known or consented to for the reason that
the borrower's own community does not so understand it.
6. Recourse Liability Is Imposed by Fiat, Not Consent
An admission that deficiency liability is based on raw,
authoritarian power would suggest that law and lenders have simply
ganged up on unsuspecting borrowers. Accordingly, lawspeakers will
retreat to their consent model and read the promissory note and
mortgage as a logical and grammatically correct statement that the
mortgagor absolutely undertook to repay the entire debt or submit to
deficiency. Lawspeakers will say the borrower's consent to the
transaction itself invoked the full traditional legal obligation of
recourse liability.
This exercise produces a satisfactory justification in lawspeak.
But if layspeak, the language of the community, reads the documents
55. See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 157-69 (1987).
56. See id.; James B. Hughes, supra note 48, at 148 (Hughes appears to believe
in such a world, but even he would require disclosure of the fundamental terms of
the deal); Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1447, 1448-49 (1990) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 7, 31-32 (Harvard 1990) and analyzing Posner's discussion of
objectivity).
[Vol. 45
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 45 [2008], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss1/3
2008] FANNIE MAE/FREDDIE MAC MORTGAGE INTERPRETATION 51
differently, the document is ambiguous.57 Special rules then apply that
justify, if not compel, application of the lay meaning-nonrecourse
debt.
58
1I. A FRESH LOOK AT MORTGAGE DOCUMENTATION JUSTIFIES
INTERPRETING HOME MORTGAGE DEBT AS NONRECOURSE.
As a prediction, any judge would dismiss a borrower's defense to
deficiency based on lack of consent. But what would happen, even in
lawspeak, if the transaction and the documents were looked at anew?
The answers may be surprising.
A. Standard Mortgage Documents Are Confusing and Ambiguous
The language problem is not lack of formalistic disclosure of the
terms of the home loan itself.5 9 Virtually all home mortgage
transactions provide borrowers with disclosure statements that spell
57. See Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1144
(Ariz. 1993). "The judge.., must avoid the often irresistible temptation to
automatically interpret contract language as he or she would understand the words.
This natural tendency is sometimes disguised in the judge's ruling that contract
language is 'unambiguous."' Id. at 1139; see also CORBIN, supra note 45, § 543A.
"Words, however, are seldom so clear that they 'apply themselves to the subject
matter.' Thus, ambiguity determined by the judge's view of 'clear meaning' is a
troublesome concept that often obstructs the court's proper and primary function in
this area-to enforce the meaning intended by the contracting parties." Id. In
determining the "intention of the parties" the court must look at the issues
referenced infra note 58.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(2) (1981) (making the
understanding of the borrower operative if (a) the borrower did not know of any
different meaning attached by the lender, or (b) the lender has reason to know the
borrower's meaning does not contemplate deficiency liability, and the lender has
reason to know of the borrower's meaning).
59. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) does not, however,
mention deficiency liability. Instead, it presents an optimistic picture that the
borrower in default may work out a settlement that can include a deed in lieu of
foreclosure. It does not clearly explain that failure to work out the arrangement will
result in deficiency. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., RESPA-Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/res/respa-hm.cfm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
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out the full terms of their loans in layspeak. 60 But the consequence of
lingering liability after foreclosure, which can be far worse than a
misstated interest rate, is not disclosed (and perhaps cannot be
disclosed meaningfully). 6' Even the standard documents prescribed by
secondary market purchasers with close affiliation with the federal
government 62  are misleading and subject to interpretation as
nonrecourse obligation, as judged by both lawspeak and layspeak.
These documents dominate the field, and their uniform covenants
apply throughout the United States' mortgage market.
60. Disclosures are even clearly written, for the most part, in layspeak, and a
super-competent lay observer could figure out the actual interest rate, terms of
payment, and so on, but they do not ordinarily disclose the lingering liability of
deficiency after foreclosure. An article that is sympathetic to the interests of
subprime borrowers calls for full disclosure, but does not mention disclosure of the
prospect of deficiency liability. See Cassandra Jones Havard, Democratizing Credit:
Examining the Structural Inequities of Subprime Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REv.
233, 266-67 (2006).
61. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL
AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 88-
98 (2004) [hereinafter U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE].
62. The Note and Security Instrument examined for the article were specialized
to Texas. FANNIE MAE/FREDDIE MAC, FORM 3044: TEXAS DEED OF TRUST (n.d.)
[hereinafter FORM 3044], available at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/
unifsecurity.html#highlights (follow "Form 3044: Texas Deed of Trust" hyperlink).
To validate the claim that the provisions apply generally, I looked at posted forms
for Alabama, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Washington, and Wisconsin. All forms contained the Uniform Covenants referred to
in the article, such as the "in addition to" language in the promissory note, the
"secures ... repayment" clause, and the "excess, if any" provision in the security
instrument. See Freddie Mac, Security Instruments,
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/ unifsecurity.html#highlights (last visited Feb.
20, 2008) (providing security instruments from different states). New York
documents could be said to give more notice of lingering liability, but they stop
short of spelling out the deficiency judgment consequence of failure to pay. The
New York Security Instrument declares that after conveyance, "I will still be fully
obligated under the Note and under this Security Instrument unless Lender agrees to
release me, in writing, from my obligations," along with a more specific indication
of personal liability in paragraph thirteen. FANNIE MAE/FREDDIE MAC, FORM 3033:
NEW YORK MORTGAGE 13 (n.d.) [hereinafter FORM 3033], available at
http://www.freddiemac.coni uniform/unifsecurity.html#highlights (follow "Form
3033: New York Mortgage" hyperlink). At best, though, the New York provisions
leave the documents as ambiguous as interpreted by a lay observer.
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B. Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Documents Can Be Interpreted as
Recourse or Nonrecourse
Fannie Mae's standard real estate security forms consist of two
documents: a promissory note and a security instrument, discussed
herein in its form as a Deed of Trust. These mortgage forms are
drafted to fit requirements of secondary market purchasers with close
ties to federal monetary and housing policy and carry uniform
covenants that apply virtually throughout the United States.63 One
must therefore assume the forms carry some credibility. What the
forms do not contain is information about recourse debt sufficient to
inform a lay observer (or even a law observer outside the specialty) of
the full consequence of default.
1. In Lawspeak, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Home Mortgage Debt Is
Recourse, with Deficiency Liability64
In paragraph one, the Promissory Note (FM Note) contains an
unconditional promise that the borrower will repay the principal
amount borrowed, plus interest. It also states that if, at maturity,
amounts are still owed, the borrower will pay those amounts. The FM
Note is made to the order of the lender, it is in writing, and it is signed
by the maker. Accepting (for the moment) lawspeak's assessment that
the promise to repay the debt is unconditional, the FM Note appears to
satisfy the formal requirements of recourse obligation and
negotiability. 65 Accordingly, a secondary market purchaser who takes
63. See Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit
Systems, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951, 971 (1997) ("Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have
promulgated a number of standard forms for use in those transactions. Transactions
that do not use those forms are not eligible for repurchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac. Accordingly, although a significant number of home-mortgage notes are not
securitized for various reasons, the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac forms dominate the
market, even for transactions in which the lender does not contemplate an immediate
sale to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.").
64. The referenced Note: FANNIE MAE/FREDDIE MAC, FORM 3200:
MULTISTATE FIXED RATE NOTE (n.d.) [hereinafter FORM 3200], available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifnotes.html (follow "Form 3200: Multistate
Fixed Rate Note" hyperlink).
65. See U.C.C. § 3-104 (2000); Ronald J. Mann, supra note 63 at 971-72
(suggesting that the borrower's right to prepay in the FNMA/FHLMC single family
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delivery of the note before maturity, for value, without notice, and by
endorsement expects to qualify as a holder in due course who is
entitled to enforce the obligation fully without regard to personal
defenses to payment.66 If that were the entire transaction, there would
be no question but that the maker of the note was obligated to repay
the entire amount, at least by lawspeak. But that is not all the FM Note
says. Paragraph ten states:
In addition to the protections given to the Note Holder under this
Note, a Mortgage, Deed of Trust, or Security Deed (the 'Security
Instrument'), dated the same date as this Note, protects the Note
Holder from possible losses which might result if I do not keep the
promises which I make in this Note.
6 7
As interpreted by lawspeakers, the security instrument simply
adds a pledge of the land to the obligation imposed in the note ("in
addition to"), and does not diminish, replace, or require the lender to
forego the absolute obligation stated in the note.68 To a lawspeaker,
the words "in addition to" would refer to the mortgage document 69
without incorporating it by reference, which would impair
negotiability.70
note impairs negotiability by including a nonmonetary undertaking of sending
notice).
66. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305 (2000).
67. FORM 3200, supra note 64, at 2.
68. See generally Baker v. Gardner, 770 P.2d 766, 775 (Ariz. 1988)
(explaining that a creditor can elect to forego foreclosure and sue on the note in all
cases except those involving the mortgages and deeds of trust to which the anti-
deficiency statutes apply).
69. See Sturgis Nat. Bank v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 184 N.E. 589, 592
(I11. 933) ("The reference to another writing which will destroy the negotiability of
an instrument, otherwise negotiable, must be of a kind which in some respect
qualifies or makes uncertain or conditional the promise."); McGee v. First Nat. Bank
of Ellsworth, 232 N.W. 336, 337 (Minn. 1933) ('The appellant contends that the
recital that the note is secured by a mortgage destroys its negotiability. This recital
in no way incorporates into the note the provisions of the mortgage, or any part
thereof. Nothing is thereby added to the contract. We therefore hold that the
instrument is negotiable.").
70. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. 1601 Partners, Ltd., 796 F. Supp. 238,
240 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
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2. In Layspeak, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Home Mortgage Debt Is
Nonrecourse, With No Liability for Deficiency
Now consider the same language from the standpoint of a
layspeaker, with the ultimate question "to what did the borrower
manifest assent?"
The words "in addition to" appear to combine the promissory note
and the mortgage and make them one. Just as one plus one produces a
single referent "two," the note "in addition to" the mortgage combines
the two documents into a single agreement.71 This lay reading would
impair negotiability and negate the privileged holder in due course
status.72 As developed below, reading the two documents together
implies nonrecourse debt.
Apart from the favored position the law gives to negotiable
instruments, the words would probably incorporate the mortgage by
reference, even in lawspeak. The reference is sufficient to make the
two documents contemporaneous agreements for Statute of Frauds 73
and parol evidence rule purposes," and to some extent they must be
read as one. The mortgage file that contains both documents is likely
to be in the physical custody or legal control of the secondary market
purchaser who is therefore on notice of the existence and terms of
both.75
71. See STEPHEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW
INTO HUMAN NATURE 1-2 (2007) for a discussion of the significance of semantics
and the linguistic question regarding how many events occurred on September 11,
2001-one or two.
72. See Resolution Trust Corp., 796 F. Supp. at 240 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 132 (1981); Crabtree v.
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 110 N.E.2d 551, 553 (N.Y. 1953).
74. See Luck v. Wood, 132 S.E. 178, 178 (Va. 1926) ("'Where two papers are
executed at the same time, or contemporaneously between the same parties, in
reference to the same subject matter, they must be regarded as parts of one
transaction and receive the same construction as if their several provisions were in
one and the same instrument."') (quoting Portsmouth Refining Co. v. Oliver
Refining Co., 64 S.E. 56, 59 (Va. 1909)).
75. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 5.28. "[If a negotiable note is
involved,] the note must be physically transferred into the hands of the person who
is gaining the right to enforce it. The use of a separate document of assignment is
not necessarily objectionable, but it cannot substitute for delivery of the note." Id.
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To the lay reader, "in addition to" implies that the note and the
deed of trust are of equal dignity, and the pledge of land acts as the
performance equivalent of enforcing the promise. The FM Note states
"the Deed of Trust ... protects the Note Holder from possible losses
which might result if I do not keep the promises which I make in this
Note."7 6 This provision specifically anticipates the potential of
nonpayment and implies that foreclosure sale perfectly "protects the
Note Holder from losses which might result if the borrower does not
keep the promises which I make in this Note. 77 Even if a lawspeaker
quibbled about this interpretation, it is hard not to accept it as a
possible and reasonable one. Consider a contract whereby:
I promise to deliver a cow named Rose to a buyer, and in addition,
if I do not deliver that cow, then to protect the buyer from possible
losses which might result if I do not keep that promise, the buyer
can pick out and take any cow in my pasture.
It would appear to a layspeaker and, even to most lawspeakers, that
the two performances are alternative, not cumulative. If I default, the
promissee can pick a cow from my pasture. That is an alternative
performance, and I do not owe another cow. The obligation has been
satisfied.
If we can read the promissory note to say the borrower will pay as
provided in the note, or, in the alternative, the lender can do what the
deed of trust provides, we must read the deed of trust closely to see
what it says to a lay reader.
3. The Note and Security Instrument Read as Contemporaneous
Documents, Reinforce Layspeak Interpretation as Nonrecourse78
In paragraph one, the Deed of Trust refers to the Note and restates
the borrower's obligations.7 9 It does not negate the lay reader's
alternative performance interpretation. Instead, it states:
76. FORM 3200, supra note 64, at 2.
77. Id.
78. FORM 3044, supra note 62.
79. Id. at 3.
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This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of the
Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the Note;
and (ii) the performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements
under this Security Instrument and the Note. For this purpose,
Borrower [conveys the land to the Trustee] .... '8
To lawspeakers, the word "secures" is associated with an entire
activity of pledging property as collateral that can be sold on default,
with proceeds applied to the debt without discharging the debt beyond
the proceeds realized.8 '
To layspeakers, the word "secures" can have an entirely different
meaning. Webster's II College Dictionary 82 defines "secure" in verb
transitive form as:
1. To guard from danger, harm, or risk of loss. 2. To make tight or
firm : FASTEN. 3. To make certain : GUARANTEE. 4. To make a
pledge on (e.g., a loan). 5. To gain possession of : ACQUIRE. 6. To
bring about : EFFECT.
As an objective observer, the layspeaker must acknowledge that
the deed of trust secures protection to the lender (not the borrower).
But what does the security instrument "secure" to the lender?
80. Id. There are variations in the language of documents specialized to
individual states. For example, Form 3018, the Kentucky Mortgage, states: "This
Security Instrument secures 150% of the principal amount of the Note, but any
amount secured in excess of the amount stated in the second sentence of this
paragraph must be a 'Protective Advance' as defined by Section 26 hereof (or, if the
rate of interest is adjustable, may be interest added to principal, commonly called
'negative amortization')." FANNIE MAE/FREDDIE MAC, FORM 3018: KENTUCKY
DEED OF TRUST 1 (n.d.) [hereinafter FORM 3018], available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.html#highlights (follow "Form
3018: Kentucky Deed of Trust" hyperlink).
81. This characterization adopts Wittgenstein's insight that words do not refer
to reality, and language is learned as a game from infancy, and meaning comes from
community members' associating words with activities, not things. LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 2, 3 (G.E.M. Anscombe, trans., 3d
ed. 2001).
82. WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 1022.
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a. Guards the Lender From Risk of Loss
By definition one in Webster's II College Dictionary, the
instrument itself' (and the rights created) guards the lender from
danger, harm, or risk of loss. By definition three, the instrument
makes the lender certain of protection by guaranteeing repayment of
the loan. These interpretations imply that the pledge itself guards the
lender from risk of loss, guarantees repayment, and makes
performance certain. If the Deed of Trust guarantees performance, the
lender has no need for deficiency, the pledge operates as an alternative
performance of the note's obligation, and the borrower is released if
the lender takes the property. 83 The dictionary definition of the word
"guarantee" nowhere suggests that a guarantor will seek recovery
against the borrower.
8 4
b. Pledge
The word "pledge" in meaning four is defined by Webster's as
"pawn.'85 In layspeak, as in lawspeak, the word "pawn" commonly
negates both the obligation to repay and the existence of a debt. This
reasonable interpretation reinforces the lay understanding that home
mortgage debt is nonrecourse. Moreover, the fact that the mortgage
document may be, and often is, called a "deed" (of trust) can imply in
layspeak that the house has been conveyed, but will be returned if the
debt is paid. The release provision of paragraph twenty-three is
consistent with this layspeak interpretation.8 6 The dictionary definition
does not even hint at a recourse outcome.
83. The Deed of Trust contains a Uniform Covenants paragraph by which in
paragraph one, the borrower promises again to pay principal and interest when due.
In paragraph three, the borrower promises to pay to the lender until the Note is paid
in full, along with escrow and other items. Restating the promise adds nothing to
what has already been discussed. See FORM 3044, supra note 62, at 3-5.
84. WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 504.
85. WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 867 (defining
the verb transitive form of pledge "3. To deposit as security : PAWN"); see also 10
N.Y. JuR. 2D Banks § 976 ("Pawn tickets do not come within the categories of
'securities and printed evidence of indebtedness,' for they are evidence not of debt,
but of a right of redemption, or a bailment subject to a debt.").
86. FORM 3044, supra note 62, at 15.
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c. But Not By Lawspeak
Real estate lawyers and lenders will blanche and fume at the lay
reading. Yet, it is as reasonable as the lawspeak reading, and it
undoubtedly reflects the intent and understanding of borrowers. If law
imposes a different outcome by applying lawspeak to an ambiguous
document, it does so by fiat,87 not by consent.
4. Failure to Disclose That Mortgage Insurance Does Not Protect
Borrowers Amounts to Concealment
Paragraph ten of the Kentucky Deed of Trust refers at length to
mortgage insurance, and states: "Mortgage Insurance reimburses
Lender (or any entity that purchases the Note) for certain losses it may
incur if Borrower does not repay the Loan as agreed. Borrower is not
a party to the Mortgage Insurance." 88
Lawyers and lenders know that mortgage insurance is paid for by
the borrower, but its purpose is to entice the lender to lend to this
borrower with little money down. 89 Mortgage insurance policies
ordinarily claim a right of subrogation to pursue the borrower for
deficiency for payments made to the lender under the policy.90 This is
likely to be stated clearly in the policy itself. But our focus is not on
what the mortgage insurance policy says. Instead, we focus on what
the security instrument says.
87. WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 423 (defining
fiat as "Latin, Let it be done. 1. An arbitrary decree. 2. Authorization or sanction").
88. FORM 3018, supra note 80, at 9.
89. See Quintin Johnstone, Private Mortgage Insurance, 39 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 783, 790-91 (2004). The Mortgage Insurance Companies of America's website
makes this clear, but borrowers are unlikely to see it. Mortgage Insurance
Companies of America, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.privaterni.com/toolsresources/faqs.cfm [hereinafter MICA] (last visited
Feb. 20, 2008).
90. Johnstone, supra note 89, at 801 n.69.
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Everything is understood in context.9 ' The word "insurance"
comes wrapped in context.92 The lender knows mortgage insurance
ordinarily protects only the lender,93 but this may not be what the
context says to a borrower. 94 To a lay borrower, the word "insurance"
means protection, which is also its dictionary definition. Merriam
Webster's online dictionary defines "insurance" as "coverage by
contract whereby one party undertakes to indemnify or guarantee
another against loss by a specified contingency or peril;" and also "a
means of guaranteeing protection or safety.,
95
The contextual understanding for an ordinary layspeaker is that
insurance protects the person who pays the policy premium. That is
the case with fire insurance, auto insurance, liability insurance, life
91. It is elementary that words acquire meaning from and within the context in
which they are used. The word "hot," for example, may imply something about
temperature, stolen goods, sexiness, popularity, or a multitude of other references.
See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597,
1652 (1990) ("The reminder that we are all in context might lead to different
understandings of who and what we are all about.").
92. See Rodman v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 905-08 (Iowa
1973). Rodman adopted a "reasonable expectations" doctrine, stating "[t]he
objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking
study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations." Id. at 906
(quoting KEETON, INSURANCE LAW-BASIC TEXT § 6.3(a), at 351 (1971)); see also C.
& J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 1975)
(quoting Rodman and applying the "reasonable expectations" doctrine).
93. See Kilmer v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 860 P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (Wyo.
1993) ("Mortgage insurance protects a mortgagee when it loans money to what
would normally be considered a higher risk mortgagor. . . . '[F]ederal mortgage
insurance is not an alternate mechanism for the repayment of defaulted loans which
extinguishes a mortgagor's obligation thereon or its liability for a deficiency
judgment.' . . . Accordingly, the mortgagee was the insured party under the federal
mortgage insurance policy.") (quoting Platte Valley Sav. by Resolution Trust Corp.
v. Crall, 821 P.2d 305, 307 (Colo. App. 1991)). Statutes in New York and Texas
specifically disable mortgage insurers from pursing deficiencies. See supra note 26.
94. For example, fifteen out of twenty-three of my students thought the words
"as required by the lender, you bought a Mortgage Insurance Policy issued by a
private insurance company" meant the borrower was protected from foreclosure
when default was due to disability.
95. Merriam-Webster Online, Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary,
Insurance, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/insurance (last visited Feb.
20, 2008).
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insurance connected with a loan, 96 and the like. In this context, the
mere term "mortgage insurance" is bound to generate unjustified
expectations that the borrower who pays the premium is somehow
protected by the policy.97 What is the policy for, if not to pay the
mortgage if the borrower is disabled or loses a job?
A closer look at the mortgage insurance provision reinforces the
borrower's notion that the lender will not seek deficiency when it
states, "Mortgage Insurance reimburses Lender . . . for . . . losses it
may incur if Borrower does not repay the Loan as agreed., 98 This
clear and simple statement implies there is nothing left of the
obligation if the lender is reimbursed for losses it may incur if the
borrower does not pay. Likewise, there is no hint that the mortgage
insurer will turn on the borrower and demand payment of deficiency
by way of subrogation.
99
What about the statement: "Borrower is not a party to the
Mortgage Insurance"? 0 0 First, it may not be true. If "party" means "in
privity," then the borrower is a party by the English definition as
providing consideration for the insurer's promise.10' The lender may
be the one that is not privy if mortgage insurance is considered as a
standalone contract. The lender can collect on the policy, but as a third
party beneficiary, and not as one who provided consideration for the
promises contained in the insurance contract.' 0 2 Saying the borrower
96. NAA Life offers such insurance, advertising, "What is Mortgage Life
Insurance? Mortgage life insurance is life insurance that pays off your mortgage in
the event of your death .... You can rest easy knowing that your family will never
lose its home, even if the unthinkable should occur." NAA Life, Homepage,
http://www.naalife.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
97. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
98. FORM 3044, supra note 62, at 9.
99. Johnstone, supra note 89, at 801.
100. FORM 3044, supra note 62, at 9.
101. See CORBIN, supra note 45, § 779.
102. This is not the only analysis that could be made. The lender does provide
consideration by making the loan that indirectly supports the insurer's promise by
requiring the borrower to buy the policy. See, e.g., Vogan v. Hayes Appraisal
Assoc., Inc., 588 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1999) (holding that the lender had privity as
promisee of a contract with an appraiser, and the borrower was third party
beneficiary of the appraiser's promise to monitor construction of a new house).
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is not a party to the contract does not imply, even in lawspeak, that the
borrower cannot benefit as third-party beneficiary.1 03
What is inexcusable is that the documentation conceals its denial
of benefits to the borrower behind lawspeak. The drafter of the
mortgage undoubtedly intended that the borrower get no benefit from
mortgage insurance. But stating the exclusion in lawspeak is a poor
excuse for a simple statement that the borrower pays the premium but
gets no benefit other than satisfying the lender's condition for making
the loan. Second, and even more crucial, why would the document not
state clearly that, in event of default, the mortgage insurer may turn on
the borrower and sue for deficiency, even though the borrower paid
his or her premium? 10 4 If the documents were drafted by an entity
with less affiliation with the U.S. Government, one might think a
common crook had undertaken to defraud, mislead, or conceal the
truth from the borrower.
5. Failure to Disclose the Prospect of Deficiency Liability After
Foreclosure Amounts to Concealment'0 5
Given the difference between recourse and nonrecourse
consequences, one would expect that a recourse mortgage document
would at least use the term deficiency somewhere in the text or spell
out the activity that creates it. The fact that the paradigm Security
Instrument never uses the terms "recourse," "deficiency," or "liability
after foreclosure" is not just misleading, it is outright deceptive. For
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
104. Johnstone, supra note 89, at 801 n.69.
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981). The
Restatement treats nondisclosure as misrepresentation,
(b) where [a party] knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a
mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is
making the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure
to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair
dealing, or (c) where [a party] knows that disclosure of the fact would
correct a mistake of the other party as to the contents or effect of a writing,
evidencing or embodying an agreement in whole or in part, or (d) where
the other person is entitled to know the fact because of a relation of trust
and confidence between them.
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example, paragraph eleven 10 6 allows the lender to apply funds from a
total taking or insured loss against the debt. But it does not state in
clear terms that the borrower remains liable for the debt if the
proceeds are inadequate to satisfy it. Instead, the paragraph states that
the excess, if any, will be paid to borrower.10 7 Failure to state what
happens if the proceeds of sale are not sufficient to pay the debt or
produce a surplus comes close to active concealment.
Paragraph twenty-two describes the lender's right to have the
property sold at foreclosure by the trustee. Nowhere does it state that
the borrower remains liable for deficiency if the proceeds of sale are
not sufficient to satisfy the debt. Instead, it optimistically states,
"[t]rustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale in the following order:
(a) to all expenses of the sale. .. ; (b) to all sums secured by this
Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to the person or persons
legally entitled to it.'
10 8
This is a crucial paragraph. It is the logical place for the document
to state clearly that if the proceeds of sale are not sufficient to satisfy
the debt, the borrower remains liable and subject to judgment for
deficiency. But it does not say that. A lawyer or lender reading the
paragraph with a contextual understanding of mortgage law does not
even pause to note the absence of the critical warning, but a
layspeaker or even a lawyer whose practice does not include real
estate would not infer liability for deficiency. Without that inference
there is no consent. An observer would not infer recourse liability.
Deficiency liability is therefore imposed by fiat, not by consent given
after full disclosure.
California'0 9  and Arizona" 0  prohibit or limit deficiency
judgments against homeowners. The critical paragraphs of the
California Security Instrument are identical to those examined herein,
so virtually the same words create a nonrecourse loan in California
106. FORM 3044, supra note 62, at 9-11.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
109. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 2006). California prohibits
deficiency on purchase money loans. Id. Nevertheless, a thriving business offers to
guide California borrowers through foreclosure for a fee of $995. See John Leland,
Facing Default, Some Walk Out on New Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at Al.
110. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-729(A) (Lexis Nexis 2007).
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and a recourse loan in Texas. Of course, the California statute makes
the difference, but a layspeak interpretation of identical
documentation as nonrecourse is reasonable.
It is an overstatement to say that lenders commit intentional fraud
by not revealing the full consequences of default. But the documents
are intentionally chosen by the lender, they are misleading in that they
conceal a critical fact, and the borrower presumably relies on what
they say.
I do not suggest that lay mortgagors read the loan documents with
a high degree of care, nor that, even if they did, they would
comprehend the full lay meaning of the words. Even more to the
point, it would do the borrower no good to read the documents
because loan terms and documents are offered on a "take-it-or-leave-
it" basis. But the "take-it-or-leave-it" lender should be held to the
same terms it imposes on borrowers. 11 A reasonable lay reader and a
reasonable law reader could easily interpret the documents as
providing (1) that the borrower promises to pay the debt, and (2) if the
borrower defaults, then (3) the lender can foreclose and have the
property sold to the highest bidder, with any excess going to the
mortgagor. And that is the end of it. There is no continuing liability,
no deficiency, no lingering judgment, and no need for bankruptcy.' 12
The documents, standing alone, are not at all instructive as to the
consequences of default. But surely, one might think, that with access
to the Internet, all of those dangers can be discovered with the click of
a mouse. However, one should not count on it. A net searcher who
knows to search "deficiency" can find some references. But just
searching websites that are maintained by lenders,1 3 loan guarantors
and insurers, Mortgage Insurance Companies of America (MICA),1 14
111. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that, "[i]n choosing among
the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning
is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or
from whom a writing otherwise proceeds." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 206 (1981).
112. There is, however, possible liability for costs of foreclosure and for waste,
even if the obligation itself is nonrecourse. See Stein, supra note 2.
113. Countrywide Financial, Homepage, http://my.countrywide.com (last
visited Feb. 20, 2008).
114. MICA, supra note 89. MICA's website does state that the insurance does
not provide a benefit to the borrower. It says nothing about deficiencies. Id.
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VA," 5 HUD' 6 and FHA," 17 secondary market purchasers, Fannie
Mae,' i8 Freddie Mac, 19 and Ginnie Mae, 120 does not give quick
access to the downside of foreclosure. Instead, these sites offer helpful
hints about avoiding foreclosure, debt counseling, and similar trivia.
They tout home ownership as a good thing. But where is the bad
news? If it is there, I could not find it by a reasonable search.
6. Full Disclosure Could Shield Lenders from Legal Responsibility for
Concealing Recourse Obligation
Words that make sense only in lawspeak do not and cannot enable
lay brains to stumble toward rational decisions that take into account
all of the downside of recourse liability. Disclosures, even if made, are
ineffective to educate borrowers as to the consequences of recourse
debt.12' Nevertheless, disclosures (particularly those written in
115. U.S. Dep't Of Veterans Affairs, Home Loan Guaranty Services,
http://www.homeloans.va.gov/ls.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
116. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Tips for Avoiding Foreclosure,
http://www.hud.gov/foreclosure/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
117. Fed. Hous. Admin., HUD Home Fact #19: Falling Behind on FHA Loan
Payments, http://www.fha.comhud-fha-19.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
118. Fannie Mae, Act Now to Avoid Foreclosure, http://www.fanniemae.com
/homepath/homeowners/in foreclosure.jhtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
119. Freddie Mac, Dos and Don'ts of Foreclosure, http://www.freddie
mac.com/corporate/buyown/english/avoiding-foreclosure/dos-and-donts.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2008). Freddie Mac does mention the possibility that "[e]ven if the
lender sells your property, you may still be responsible for the difference in the sale
price and what you owe." But it takes a while to navigate through the site to that
statement. Id.
120. Ginnie Mae, Your Path to Homeownership,
http://www.ginniemae.gov/ypth/index.asp?Section=YPTH (last visited Feb. 20,
2008).
121. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 61, at 88-98. The author
of an article about disclosures in a medical setting states
[p]hysician-investigators face the daunting task of enrolling desperate
patients into Phase I cancer trials that are not meant to be therapeutic.
Patients doggedly regard the trials as therapeutic, and researchers tend to
collaborate in their confusion by glossing the trial's true purposes and
noting the occasional benefit that subjects accidentally receive.
Matthew Miller, Phase I Cancer Trials: A Collusion of Misunderstanding, 30
HASTING CTR. REP. 4 (July-Aug. 2000). Home mortgage borrowers are equally blind
to information about the deficiency downside of mortgage foreclosure, and equally
31
Mixon: Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Home Mortgage Documents Interpreted as Non
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
lawspeak) have an obvious strategic function of protecting lenders
from claims of fraud. That function might prompt a rational lender to
disclose the consequences of recourse liability; but there is not even a
lawspeak disclosure in the standard mortgage documentation. At best,
disclosure is partial and the most important part of all may be left out.
C. Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Promissory Note and Security
Instrument Are Ambiguous
1. How Should Ambiguity Be Addressed?
a. The Drafter May or May Not Have Intended
to Impose Recourse Liability
Lenders may or may not' 22 intend to impose liability for
deficiency after foreclosure, but absent statutory limitations, the
standard mortgage transaction is widely assumed to impose recourse
obligation with liability for deficiency after foreclosure. Accordingly,
if we live in an objectivist, modern world in which reality is apparent
and available to all of us, and if the content of the documents is tested
by the "intent of the author," the documents may impose liability for
deficiency after foreclosure. But the world of human understanding is
not objectivist, and the intent of the author is not controlling when a
reader interprets a text.
b. Read Textually, the Documents do Not Impose Recourse Liability
Postmodern literary theory' 23 may not be worth much in ordinary
legal discourse,1 24 but it undeniably has something to say about a
unable to appreciate its consequences when recruited by mortgage lenders eager to
earn a brokerage fee.
122. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
123. See generally ROBERT L. HAYMAN JR., NANCY LEVIT & RICHARD
DELGADO, JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW
TO POSTMODERNISM 749 (Jean Stefancic ed., West Group 2002) (1995); Peter C.
Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory
Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2505 (1992).
124. See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1613, 1625-30 (1990) (pointing out that
deconstruction is a political practice, not a tool of legal analysis).
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mortgagor's understanding of the deficiency question, and it is
consistent with today's cognitive science.
We know only what our individual brains can understand by way
of interpretation. 125 The brain has some inherent capabilities, but
everything we assume to understand has to be interpreted in the light
of past private experience that has been recorded in our neural
memory. 126 All thought is physical and occurs within the body's
neural system, mostly inside the skull. 127 We can never know reality
as truth; all we think we know is belief. 128 Unless the potential of
lingering liability is somehow lodged inside the borrower's brain, it
simply has not been taken into account.
There is no mental "I" separate and apart from the physical brain,
that acts as Descartes' thinker. 129 Likewise, there is no transcendental
reason that enables us to expand our knowledge of reality by
reasoning from one abstract or foundational proposition to another.
1 30
The lay mind may contain two schemas for loans-a payday loan and a
pledge at the pawnshop. Reason does not say the obligation to pay a
mortgage debt is like a promise to repay a payday loan, and not like a
pledge of a guitar at the pawnshop. Failure to repay the payday loan
may result in legal action, physical injury, or midnight phone calls;
failure to redeem the pledged guitar means the pawnshop owner will
keep it and sell it to somebody else. There is no necessary logic that
says the mortgage promise is more like one of these familiar
tranrsactions than the other.
125. See ANTONIO DAMAsIO, DESCARTES' ERROR 96-113 (Penguin Books
1994). "Dispositional representations constitute our full repository of knowledge,
encompassing both innate knowledge and knowledge acquired by experience." Id. at
104.
126. Id. at 97. "These various images-perceptual, recalled from real past, and
recalled from plans of the future-are constructions of your organism's brain. All
that you can know for certain is that they are real to your self, and that other beings
make comparable images." Id.
127. Id. at 98-100. Damasio describes the physical process by which neural
activity forms perceptual images. Id.
128. Schank, supra note 123, at 2508.
129. See DAMASIO, supra note 125, at 247-52.
130. See DAMASIO, supra note 125, at 170-73; Schanck, supra note 123, at
2508.
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When a reader (a mortgagor) is presented with a mortgage and
note to sign, the text is all there is.' 3 1 The author of the text, if not
"dead" as popularly referenced in postmodern literary theory, 132 is at
least not accessible to the reader. The author's intent therefore does
not produce the reader's interpretation. The text is all law ordinarily
takes into account, for example, applying a parol evidence rule to limit
consideration to the written document, but admitting extraneous
evidence to resolve meaning when an instrument is ambiguous.' 3 3 The
text of the mortgage documents nowhere commands deficiency
liability after foreclosure.
Meaning attaches, not just to texts, but also to context. 134 The
home mortgage transaction itself is an event with far greater meaning
than the words in the documents, the written texts. Probably few, if
any, people in the lender's own office have read the documents all the
way through, and even fewer understand the lawspeak consequences
of the words. It is the activity of borrowing, lending, signing
documents, making payments, defaulting, and foreclosing that lenders
and lawyers understand. As judged by their behavior, many, perhaps
most lenders do not expect the loans to be treated as recourse debt. To
the extent borrowers know about this practice, their expectations that
foreclosure is the end of their obligations are reinforced.
Decisions are not a product of pure reason.' 3 5 Decisions are,
instead, the result of fairly messy neural competition within the brain
to find a fit between incoming data and an appropriate cognitive
131. See James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 415, 417 (1982).
132. See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, Death of the Author, in IMAGE, Music, TEXT
142, 142-48 (Hill and Wang ed., Stephen Health, trans. 1977).
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209-217 (1981); e.g., id.
§ 214(c) (allowing admission of parol evidence to establish the meaning of the
agreement).
134. See Minow and Spelman, supra note 91.
135. See Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self-
Limitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders From Predatory Lending, 36 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 693, 726 (2003) ("When a person is buffeted by influences, threats, pleas,
and promises from all sides, from parents, churches, friends, governments, and
businesses, it is difficult to determine whether that person's decisions were made
autonomously or were merely the product of one or more outside influences.").
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model, schema, or meme to classify them for possible action. 3 6
Imbedded schemas, such as "home ownership is a good investment
with tax benefits," may engage other parts of the brain and prompt
motor neurons to fire, thereby producing a call to a real estate agent.
The entire homebuilding industry combines with the mortgage lending
industry to build those neural patterns within the minds of their
customers. Their joint prosperity depends more on implanting mental
images than on customers making rational choices based on economic
balancing of alternatives.
This is why home mortgage borrowers neither understand, expect,
nor consent to lingering liability for deficiencies after foreclosure. For
that matter, neither does the lender's loan closer who did not go to law
school and understands only the origination and not the foreclosure
process. Neither the language used in the mortgage documents nor the
nature of the transaction itself carries lawspeak's recourse
consequences into the minds of borrowers or creates the mental
association in the language of the ordinary borrower. That
consequence is inferred only by lawspeakers.
The difference between a robber and a lender armed with a
deficiency judgment is the rule of law, which defines both. Is there not
a reservoir of justice in legal rules that can be called upon to prevent
law from being used as a total fraud?
2. Traditional Legal Doctrine Justifies Nonrecourse Interpretation
There is one unambiguous provision that is understood in both
layspeak and lawspeak; if the borrower defaults, the lender can
foreclose and have the property sold. Ambiguity exists as to whether
136. See MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND 17 (1986).
[Y]ou can build a mind from many little parts, each mindless by itself. I'll
call "Society of Mind" this scheme in which each mind is made of many
smaller processes. These we'll call agents. Each mental agent by itself can
only do some simple thing that needs no mind or thought at all. Yet when
we join these agents in societies-in certain very special ways-this leads
to true intelligence.
Id.; see also LAKOFF, supra note 55, at 13 ("Cognitive models are directly embodied
with respect to their content, or else they are systematically linked to directly
embodied models. Cognitive models structure thought and are used in forming
categories and in reasoning. Concepts characterized by cognitive models are
understood via the embodiment of the models.").
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foreclosure and loss of the house extinguishes the debt. If the
obligation is nonrecourse, the debt is paid; if it is recourse, it remains
owing. There is no common language or common understanding that
determines the issue.
a. Extrinsic Evidence Can Be Admitted to
Explain Ambiguous Documents
137
A standard way of resolving contract ambiguity is to ask whether
one party understood that the other had a different meaning for the
terms. If so, then the knowledge is treated as a fault basis for choosing
the meaning of the mistaken party.' 38 The borrower did not even know
about the alternative meaning and is free from sin. The lender,
however, is a member of both the lawspeak community and the
layspeak community. At the office, the lender speaks lawspeak. At
the comer grocery, the lender speaks layspeak. When the lender writes
a letter to his or her mother, he or she uses Webster's Dictionary, not
Black's Law Dictionary. As a layspeaker as well as lawspeaker, the
lender either knew or should have known that the borrower did not
understand the lingering liability consequences of the transaction
enough to have consented to them. 1
39
137. See generally Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, The Parol Evidence Rule
and Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence to Establish and Clarify Ambiguity in
Written Contract, 40 A.L.R. 3D 1384 (1971) (citing hundreds of cases for this
proposition).
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(2)(b) (1981)
(indicating the borrower's meaning attaches if the borrower does not know of any
different meaning attached by the other, and the other lender knows the meaning
attached by the borrower). There is also a robust inclination to construe ambiguous
documents against the drafter. See Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 663
N.W.2d 447, 455 (Mich. 2003) ("In interpreting a contract whose language is
ambiguous, the jury should also consider that ambiguities are to be construed against
the drafter of the document.").
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). The
Restatement has special rules for standardized agreements, such as the mortgage
documents. Subsection two favors interpreting such agreements as treating alike all
those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the
standard terms of the writing. Subsection three implies that if the lender has reason
to believe the borrower would not agree if he knew that the writing contained a
particular term (recourse liability), the term is not part of the agreement. Id. Home
mortgage borrowers and lenders are not similarly situated, and the lender should
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If the document is ambiguous, a question of fact is raised, namely
"what was the intent of the parties?" However, the answer is not
clear. 140 If in fact lenders do not pursue deficiencies in the vast
majority of transactions, it is reasonable to say that lenders as well as
borrowers did not intend such consequences, at least as judged by
their behavior. 41 At a minimum, the lender knew or should have
known of the borrower's understanding-or lack of understanding.
That being the case, courts should adopt the borrower's meaning and
declare the debt nonrecourse as a matter of law unless the lender can
prove otherwise.
b. Recourse Obligation Is Unconscionable,
Absent Disclosure and Negotiation142
The seventeen pages of Fannie Mae's Security Instrument are
procedurally unconscionable' 43 in that they are written in lawspeak
that is confusing, misleading, and unintelligible to the borrower.
Mortgage documents are unquestionably contracts of adhesion. The
lender possesses overpowering financial power and legal knowledge.
The borrower has no choice other than to accept the deal or be left out
of the home market entirely.
The lender's failure to reveal the full consequences of default and
to refuse to negotiate on that point is substantively unconscionable.
Recourse liability is an unexpected and harsh penalty for default
know that the borrower does not understand recourse liability. Whether informed
borrowers would nevertheless enter into the agreement is unknown as applied in
particular cases.
140. Taken literally, the question itself is nonsense. Intent as a describable
function is purely personal. There may or may not be two intents as to deficiency, or
it may never have been contemplated by either party. The issue is really one of
inference, and the issues previously discussed, whether a lay or law observer is
postulated, continue unresolved.
141. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-
302 (2000).
143. See Higgins v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 301 (Ct. App. 2006)
("Unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive element, the former
focusing on 'oppression' or 'surprise' due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on
'overly harsh' or 'one-sided' results.") (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health
Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000)).
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unless it is revealed and negotiated. 144 The burden of recourse liability
on the borrower far outweighs the benefit to the lender. Given their
behavior, most lenders do not intend to enforce their contract right to
deficiency. They expect, instead, to acquire power they can exercise
over the borrower if they choose. This grant of arbitrary power is itself
unconscionable unless connected with some real economic interest.
Lenders bear the unavoidable risk of market decline, and any
attempt to pass it off to the average home mortgage borrower is
simply unconscionable, unless the assignment of risk is clearly
negotiated, bargained for, and understood by the borrower. 145
3. Nonrecourse Status Does Not Impair Negotiability
Recourse liability and negotiability are separate, but related,
concepts. Purchasers of negotiable home mortgage notes can claim
holder in due course 14 6 protection from personal defense advanced by
the borrower that lessens the apparent obligation on the note, 4 7
whether the note is recourse or nonrecourse. 148 Nonrecourse status
simply limits the payment to a particular source (the land).149
The Fannie Mae Note may be nonnegotiable as well as
nonrecourse. Uniform Commercial Code section 3-104(a)(3)(ii)
144. See id.
145. See id. ("'The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive
unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion
to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.'
But they need not be present in the same degree. 'Essentially a sliding scale is
invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the contract
formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or
unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.' In other words, the more
substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is
unenforceable, and vice versa.") (quoting Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690 (Cal. 2000));
Siddhartha Venkatesan, Note, Abrogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine in
Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively Police Predatory Lending, 7
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 206-09 (2003) (arguing that the doctrine is
detrimental and operates inefficiently between homeowners and assignees).
146. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2000).
147. U.C.C. § 3-106(b)(ii) (2000).
148. U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3) (2000).
149. See Johnstone, supra note 89, at 801 n.69.
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preserves negotiability even though the note contains "an
authorization or power to the holder to... realize on or dispose of
collateral. .. ." The traditional analysis of real estate mortgage notes
is that the mortgage acts simply as collateral. 150 But if the Fannie Mae
Note's "in addition to" reference to the security instrument requires
the two documents to be read together, 151 the multiple additional
provisions in the security instrument render the note nonnegotiable.
A secondary market purchaser may claim that the appearance of
the note as recourse obligation may make it such in the hands of a
holder in due course. But to be a holder in due course the purchaser
must, in addition to the technical requirements, buy in good faith and
without notice that the maker (borrower) had a defense. 52 Secondary
market purchasers undoubtedly acquire possession or control of the
entire file associated with the home mortgage loans they buy. 153
Therefore, they have access to the security instrument and note that, as
interpreted in layspeak, are misleading, ambiguous, and nonrecourse.
Consequently, secondary market purchasers have notice that the
obligation itself is nonrecourse, or at least ambiguous as to personal
liability. 154
150. U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3)(i) (2000); U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3)(ii) (2000).
151. See U.C.C. § 3-106(a)(iii) (2000); U.C.C. § 3-106 official cmt. para. 2
(2000).
152. U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2) (2000); U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(2) (2000).
153. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending,
Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503,
538 (2002) (describing the secondary market operation of securitization of loans).
154. Holder in due course protection in predatory lending cases is giving way
to assignee liability in light of recent abuses. See Julie R. Caggiano et al., Predatory
Lending Law Developments and Assignee Liability Under HOEPA and State Law,
62 Bus. LAW. 617, 620-21 (Feb. 2007) ("An individual borrower under HOEPA
may assert a defensive claim against an assignee who is trying to enforce the loan
following a borrower's default .... Should the law go beyond that displacement of
the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") holder in due course doctrine, e.g., to
permit affirmative claims to be brought against an innocent assignee, often as a class
action, independent of the borrower's default and enforcement of the loan by the
assignee? A literal reading of the HOEPA language might include affirmative
claims, but the legislative history makes clear that the purpose of the provision on
affirmative claims was to displace the effect of the 'holder in due course' doctrine
under the UCC, which applies only to defensive claims and which should be the
standard."); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall
Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2042 (2007)
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Uniform Commercial Code section 3-305(a)(1)(iii) preserves a
defense of fraud (fraud in the factum) as against a holder in due course
if the obligor- was induced to sign the instrument with neither
knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to learn of its character or its
essential terms. 155 The case made herein does not fit the classic
definition of fraud in the factum as, for example, having a blind
person sign a check represented to be a laundry ticket. But it does fall
in the same category from the standpoint of an objective observer.
Fraud in the factum involves such deceit when the maker does not
know or have an opportunity to know its essential terms. The maker of
a home mortgage note may know that he or she is signing a note and
may understand the remedy of foreclosure. But a note can still be
recourse or nonrecourse, and the essential fact of recourse liability is
not revealed in the documentation, but is concealed by the lender's
own documentation. Concealment deprives the maker of the
opportunity to know this essential character of the note, providing the
borrower a real defense as to the recourse aspect of the note, though
not to the lien on the property.
III. REALITY, POLICY, AND JUSTICE SUPPORT
NONRECOURSE TREATMENT
It would be unrealistic to think that the truths revealed herein will
cause courts to declare that a much-used set of mortgage documents
(proposing the imposition of assignee liability on securitized secondary market
purchasers). Also, "[t]he Truth in Lending Act (TILA) allows borrowers to recover
against assignees for originators' violations if the violations are 'apparent on the
face of federal disclosure statements." Id. at 2052 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1641(a),
(e)(2) (2000)).
155. Milton Roberts, Annotation, Fraud in the Inducement and Fraud in the
Factum as Defenses Under UCC § 3-305 Against Holder in Due Course, 78 A.L.R.
3D 1020, 1033 (1977) ("[T]he misrepresentation of a water softener equipment
company's salesman as to the nature and effect of a cognovit note and security
agreement warranted assertion by the maker of the defense of fraud in the factum
under Code § 3-305(2)(c), as against a holder in due course .... ) (quoting
American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 240 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio App. 1968)). But see Savoy
v. White, 788 F. Supp. 69 (D. Mass. 1992) (precluding the maker of promissory
notes from asserting a personal defense against the National Credit Union
Administration, which held holder in due course status by taking over the assets of a
defunct credit union).
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does not impose recourse liability on homeowners. If courts did
decide that this particular Security Instrument is nonrecourse, then it
would have far-reaching consequences, considering the similarity of
home purchase mortgage documents.
A. Basic Mortgage Law Would Be Unaffected by Holding the Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac Documents Nonrecourse
The cash value of declaring the Fannie Mae Security Instrument
nonrecourse may be substantial if losses on subprime mortgages
generate serious efforts to impose liability after foreclosure on home
purchasers. Recasting, in particular, subprime home mortgage
documents as nonrecourse provides a rough measure of justice by
imposing the market loss on the bad guys. 156 The loss from this
financial debacle has already been taken at the investment end, with
banks and Wall Street firms writing off billions of dollars in losses.
157
Recasting specific mortgage documents affects the obligations created
by these culpable market participants, but, since background mortgage
law stays unchanged, borrowers and lenders remain free to create
recourse liability. 158 Not all lenders are guilty of the excesses and
frauds committed by some subprime lenders. Holding home mortgage
notes nonrecourse would undoubtedly hurt some innocent lenders and
benefit some crooked borrowers. But law needs to be right in more
cases than it is wrong. On balance, nonrecourse treatment is justified
because in the ordinary, honest borrower's case, he or she did not
bargain for recourse liability, and the lender did not reveal the
consequence. When borrower fraud is a serious issue, the lender is
likely to have a tort action to litigate liability and damages.
156. For an example of a particularly egregious case of subprime lending see
Venkatesan, supra note 145, at 180,
157. MAJORITY STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., supra note 15, at
1.
158. See Venkatesan, supra note 145, at 206-08 (arguing that the doctrine is
inefficient as applied in the subprime secondary market); see also Mann, supra note
63, at 971 (calling negotiability in home-mortgage transactions irrelevant).
41
Mixon: Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Home Mortgage Documents Interpreted as Non
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
76 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
B. Deficiency Liability After Home Mortgage
Foreclosure Is Inefficient
1. As Measured by Traditional Economic Theory
Economists undertake to apply scientific method to analyze
market activity in terms of efficiency-a net increase in individual
satisfactions, which is implicitly assumed to be a good thing 5 9 or, per
Richard Posner, an increase in overall wealth. 60 Economists construct
hypothetical models of behavior that postulate both borrowers and
lenders as rational maximizers of their own utility in an amoral
market. 161 Rationality implies the borrower is competent and has
enough information to commit to the obligation.
1 62
Fraud is inefficient in that it misleads market participants into
making irrational choices. 163 Documentary concealment of the
consequences of default and foreclosure has the same effect as fraud,
159. See Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of the
Economic Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 817-22, 829-30, 837
(1989).
160. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 103 (1979) ("[T]he economic norm I shall call 'wealth
maximization' provides a firmer basis for a normative theory of law than does
utilitarianism.").
161. See, e.g., Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and
Mortgage Credit, 88 THE REVIEW OF ECON. AND STAT. 177, 177-78, 181-82 (2006)
(identifying state laws that require judicial foreclosure and periods of redemption as
discouraging lenders from making very low equity loans). Pence does not single out
antideficiency laws as a factor, although she does include them in her equation. Id.
162. RICHARDA. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 51, 51 (1973). Posner
states: "If... the product is complex and any defects latent, and if it is purchased
infrequently, the cost of obtaining relevant information may be much higher to the
consumer than to the seller and the seller should be liable for nondisclosure of
information important to a sensible choice by the consumer." Id. It is clear that the
borrower is the consumer, the home mortgage transaction is complex, and the seller
does not disclose the important information a consumer needs.
163. For an unsympathetic discussion of this aspect of fraud see POSNER, supra
note 162, at 156-57. See also Siddhartha Venkatesan, Note, Abrogating the Holder
in Due Course Doctrine in Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively
Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 206-09 (2003)
(arguing that holder in due course doctrine operates inefficiently between
homeowners and assignees). Advocates of the holder in due course doctrine argue
that it will shield assignees from claims of fraud in subprime transactions. Id.
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in that borrowers cannot accurately measure the exchange value of the
loan and therefore, cannot make a rational decision.' 64 If lenders get
the advantage of recourse liability without full disclosure, there is not
only a lack of incentive to disclose, there is incentive to avoid calling
borrowers' attention to the downside of default. Lenders'
advertisements and websites bear this out.
Judged as wealth maximization 165 , there is a net wealth loss if the
gain to the lender from deficiency collections is smaller than the loss
to the borrower, or if the borrower chooses bankruptcy to wipe out the
debt. The loss to individual borrowers probably exceeds gains to the
lender when collection costs, market exclusion, lawyers' fees, and
demoralization are taken into account. Thus, deficiency liability
flunks the wealth maximization test.
If the market offered a choice, risk averse borrowers who were
willing to pay additional interest or settle for a lower loan-to-value
ratio would logically bargain for nonrecourse debt.' 66 Willing lenders
164. Even advocates of "personal responsibility" on the part of borrowers
acknowledge the necessity of full disclosure and the possibility that some borrowers
cannot comprehend the fundamental facts of a complex transaction. See Hughes,
supra note 42, at 143-44. Hughes emphasizes disclosure of foreclosure as a
consequence of breach, not deficiency liability. Id. at 144. "It should be the
mortgagee's responsibility to insure that all required disclosures are made to the
mortgagor ..... Id.
165. See Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative
Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 227, 227 (1980).
According to Richard Posner, legal rules (at least those promulgated by
common law courts) can best be understood as efforts, usually
unconscious, to maximize wealth. In Posner's view, wealth maximization
is an ethically attractive goal. His recent article on the subject seeks to
show that wealth maximization has properties that make it preferable, from
a moral point of view, to other normative principles, particularly
utilitarianism (with which, Posner claims, wealth maximization is often
confused).
Id.
166. A rational borrower who uses nonrecourse financing has an option to pay
and keep the property or to default and lose the property along with a period of bad
credit. A recourse borrower, on the other hand, runs the risk of a ruinous deficiency
judgment that, if not paid, will linger for ten years or longer, ready to grab any non-
exempt asset the debtor acquires during that time. All professional developers are
aware of the distinction and those who are financially able to do so bargain for
nonrecourse or limited recourse financing.
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would assess the nonrecourse borrower's credit and property value
more carefully because the lender, not the borrower, would clearly
bear the risk of market downturn. This is what happens in the
commercial real estate market, where all participants understand the
difference between recourse and nonrecourse obligations and are in a
position to bargain to efficient outcomes.' 67 But this is not the case in
the home loan market, 168 where loans that are expressly nonrecourse
are virtually unknown.
In a purely rational home mortgage market, lenders would offer
two rates: lower rates to home buyers who agree to recourse
financing, and higher rates to those who bargain for nonrecourse
financing. The home mortgage finance market does not do this,
perhaps because having two types of loans would increase the
complexity of transactions without producing much gain. Contrary to
rational economic assumption, mortgage rates in California, where
purchase mortgages are nonrecourse by statute, do not appear to be
dramatically different from rates in states that permit deficiencies after
foreclosure. 169
The influence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in secondary
mortgage finance may have discouraged development of alternative
mortgage types, particularly with respect to recourse and nonrecourse
liability. 170 A market apologist would assert that having a single
167. Stein, supra note 2, at 1210 ("Real estate lenders readily agree to
nonrecourse loans in spite of their greater risk .... The slightly greater risk may
translate into a modest increase in the interest rate.").
168. Home equity mortgages may be treated differently. See, e.g., TEX. CONST.
art. 16, § 50 (a)(6)(B-C) (authorizing home equity loans only if they include
nonrecourse obligations).
169. A visit to the website, Realtors.com, showed California (antideficiency)
rates at or below the average on a 30-year fixed rate home mortgage for $300,000
with 5% down. On February 15, 2008, the lowest posted rate for Sacramento and
Stockton was 5.753%, the same as Albany, N.Y., Denver, Colorado, Belleview,
Washington, Fort Myers, Florida, and Indianapolis, Indiana. Austin and Houston,
Texas were slightly lower at 5.704%, and Bennington, Vermont was higher at
6.25%. Move, Inc., Home Finance: Compare Rates, http://finance.move.com/
homefinance/findlender/findlender.asp?poe=&gate=&nksrc=MINGFALSRPBCO1
(last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (displaying a search engine for the current rates).
170. Richard Posner states without approval, "[s]ome economists believe that
monopoly reduces the incentive of the firm to innovate and to use its inputs
efficiently." POSNER, supra note 162, at 108. To the extent that FNMA and GNMA
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nonnegotiable set of documents is efficient, in that it eliminates
wasteful bargaining over terms. 171 It does this, however, at the cost of
depriving borrowers of true, intelligent choice.
Lenders may argue that nonrecourse home loans pose a moral
hazard that borrowers would walk away from home mortgage
obligations whenever house values drop below mortgage debt. Despite
some evidence to support the proposition, borrowers have other
reasons for not walking away from their homes, notably that they
would probably pay the same amount in rent if they lost the
mortgaged house. In addition, if lenders do not ordinarily pursue
deficiencies, or if borrowers do not know about deficiency liability,
there is no reason to think that fear of deficiency will prompt
borrowers to stretch their budgets to perform. Economic theory would
hold that, if nonrecourse loans resulted in higher defaults, lenders
would either raise rates or restrict funds in the area. 17 2 Neither seems
to have happened in California where home purchase loans are
nonrecourse. 1
73
have monopolized mortgage documentation, innovation does seem to have been
reduced.
171. Id. at 37.
172. See Move, Inc. supra note 169. California eliminated purchase mortgage
deficiencies and suffered no lack of mortgage investment. Stockton, California is
one of the most overbuilt housing areas in the country, partly as a result of excessive
subprime lending. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Secretary Paulson's
Prepared Remarks Before Stockton Housing Town Hall Meeting (Dec. 18, 2007),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp743.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2008). Texas
law authorizes home equity loans only if nonrecourse. TEX. CONST. art. 16 §
50(a)(6)(C). VA loans are for all practical purposes nonrecourse, apparently without
an increase in defaults. See supra notes 22-23. Lenders would argue that recourse
liability and holder in due course protection are efficient in that they reduce the risk
to secondary market purchasers and therefore reduce the price of borrowed money
to borrowers. To some extent this may be true. It would not be troubling to allow
some aspects of negotiability for nonrecourse notes, for example, protection from
purely personal misrepresentations that are not revealed in the documents and
related papers. But negotiability does not necessarily impart efficiency. Ronald
Mann argues that negotiability is not an important aspect of today's payment
systems. Mann, supra note 63, at 953. Secondary market purchasers are just as
likely to rely on originating lenders to make sensible loans as they may rely on
negotiability as a significant aspect of value.
173. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 2006).
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A rational lender who forecloses recourse mortgage debt by
judicial procedure would obtain a deficiency judgment if the
additional cost in time and fees is minimal and if the judgment has
some value. But this gain is nullified if the time value of money
makes alternative arrangements such as negotiated settlement more
profitable. Particularly where foreclosure produces a right to statutory
redemption, lenders may forego deficiency and bargain for a
voluntary conveyance to speed up liquidation. Unfortunately,
securitization makes such individual bargaining problematic and
removes this theoretically efficient outcome. 174
A rational lender who forecloses nonjudicially would assess
whether the value of likely collections outweighs the cost of the
judicial procedure required to obtain a judgment lien against the
borrower and the costs of continuing pursuit. For some lenders, public
perceptions of overreaching may be viewed as a cost. A rational
lender might, in lieu of judicial action, sell the claim to a debt
collection entity at a substantial discount or use collection agents who
will threaten legal action, but file suit only if the prospect of collection
outweighs the cost of suit. Recourse liability may be worth a few
pennies to such lenders and to private mortgage insurers, but there is
little social advantage in encouraging collection tactics that impose
external costs of abuse that are not taken into account by the industry.
Bankruptcy offers a way out for borrowers when deficiency
liability becomes unbearable. This unattractive, expensive, inefficient
option destroys any benefit lenders derive from recourse liability.1 75
174. Securitization of mortgage loans makes any individualized negotiation
difficult, if not impossible. "One of the principal characteristics of securitization is
that it tends to erect many barriers that prevent consumers from complaining
effectively about unethical, unfair, or illegal treatment by loan brokers, originators,
or servicers." Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role of
Securitization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 110th Cong. 11 (2007) (statement of Christopher L. Peterson, Associate
Professor of Law, University of Florida), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ACFE4F.pdf.
175. Only Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy is available for home mortgage
debt, inasmuch as Chapter 13 prohibits modification of mortgages secured by a first
lien on the debtor's primary residence. See 7 WILLIAM NORTON JR., NORTON
BANKRupTcY LAW AND PRACTICE § 149:8 (3d ed. 2008) ("[Section] 1322(b)(2)
permits a Chapter 13 debtor to modify the rights of the holders of secured claims or
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Unless lawyers' fees are counted as generating positive utility instead
of wasted transaction costs, the overall loss from recourse liability
appears to outweigh any efficiency gains when bankruptcy is
considered a viable option.
Continuing liability after foreclosure shifts the risk of market
decline from lender to borrower. An efficiency analysis justifies this
shift only if borrowers consented to it at the time of contract,
something they simply did not do.
2. As Measured by Behavioral Economics
Behavioral economics is less rigidly formulaic, and probably
more realistic in its assessment of human economic behavior.1 76
Applying what is called "bounded rationality," behavioral economists
acknowledge the limited cognitive abilities that constrain human
problem solving.' 77 "Bounded willpower" implies people sometimes
make decisions against their long-term interest.1 78  These
acknowledgments considerably weaken the notion that borrowers are
so rational that they obtain information they do not know they need,
weigh all consequences of their decisions, and reach a conclusion
based on rational self-interest. The behavioral concept of "bounded
self-interest" implies humans are often willing to sacrifice their own
interests to help others. 7 9 At the risk of humanizing government
institutions, FHA's and particularly VA's forbearance policies seem to
be based on bounded self-interest. 180
unsecured claims 'other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence."').
176. See Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7948, 2000), available at
http:www.nber.org/papers/w7948.
177. Id. at 3-4.
178. Id. at 4-5.
179. See Mullaninathan & Thaler, supra note 176.
180. See supra notes 22-23.
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C. Uniform Law Proposals Would Eliminate Deficiency Liability
Following Home Mortgage Foreclosure
The idea of eliminating deficiency judgments following home
mortgage foreclosures is not a radical dream hatched by a single law
professor.181 Several states now prohibit or restrict deficiency
collection on home mortgages.1 82 Section 511(b) of a proposed
Uniform Land Security Interest Act would eliminate liability for
deficiency after foreclosure of a mortgage on property bought for
individual use as a personal residence.' 83 The new Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act shelters home mortgage debtors except in
cases of fraud. 184 These Acts, though not currently adopted, 85 imply
that when home mortgage recourse liability is considered anew, it is
found wanting. The attractive thing about holding the predominant
mortgage form nonrecourse is it could provide a large-scale test of the
concept without radically changing mortgage law itself. If it works,
then the idea can spread. If it does not work, basic mortgage law is
unaffected and recourse documents can be drafted (more artfully than
the current Fannie Mae form).
181. I have written one article and coauthored a second on the subject. See
John Mixon, Deficiency Judgments Following Home Mortgage Foreclosure: An
Anachronism that Increases Personal Tragedy, Impedes Regional Economic
Recovery, and Means Little to Lenders, 22 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1 (1991); John Mixon
& Ira B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relieffor Foreclosed Homeowners: ULSIA Section
511(b), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 455 (1992).
182. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
183. Uniform Land Transactions Act § 1-203(a)(1) (1975). This Act assigns
protected party status to individuals who give security interests on their residential
property. Section 3-510(b) states: "If the debtor is a protected party and the
obligation secured is a purchase money security interest, there is no liability for a
deficiency, notwithstanding any agreement of the protected party." Id.
184. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The
Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1489 (2004).
185. See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Why Mortgagors Can't Get No Satisfaction,
72 Mo. L. REv. 1159, 1207 (2007).
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D. Trust as a Public Good Is Reinforced by
Holding Home Mortgages Nonrecourse
Many demoralized borrowers facing foreclosure do not
understand that legal representation might be useful if they could
afford it, and they would not know to ask about recourse debt
consequences. Except for personal injury claims with substantial
medical or earnings loss, most ordinary citizens are better off taking
what an economics-driven market offers than undertaking a legal
contest. This reality leaves powerful market participants as judges of
their own case. Life is full of examples of abuse; for example,
insurance companies that delay and deny legitimate casualty payments
or, deny health coverage and let insureds die, and Internet sales that
unilaterally impose unconscionable terms on downloads.
Trust is a serious casualty when concentrated market power is
placed in the hands of such private interests, especially when it is
exercised unfairly.
E. Trust is a Public Good
Francis Fukuyama makes a convincing case that trust is a public
good.186 A nation with high trust in its institutions supports industrial
and financial development that is impossible where trust is lacking.1
87
For example, people trust Swiss banks, not Kenyan banks; and capital
accumulation is possible in Europe, but not Africa. Continued betrayal
of trust by lenders, insurance companies, and the legal system will
eventually damage any nation's fundamental economy, respect for
law, and community morality itself. 
18 8
186. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION
OF PROSPERITY 151 (The Free Press, 1995) ("[Tlhe presence of a high degree of
trust as an additional condition of economic relations can increase economic
efficiency by reducing what economists call transaction costs, incurred by activities
like ... negotiating a contract .... Each of these transactions is made easier if the
parties believe in each other's basic honesty: there is less need to spell things out in
lengthy contracts; less need to hedge against unexpected contingencies; fewer
disputes, and less need to litigate if disputes arise.").
187. Id. at 30.
188. Id.
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Mortgage lenders present themselves to the consuming public as
business entities worthy of trust, and borrowers tend to trust them.1 89
Lenders ordinarily trust borrowers to repay. Citizens trust the legal
system to be fair. Trust must be mutual to maintain the public good.
When mortgage documents hide the downside of a home
mortgage transaction in a foreign language and impose the burden of
recourse liability on borrowers that vastly outweighs benefit to the
lender, trust is sacrificed along with fairness. The subprime mess
came from violation of trust. Many subprime borrowers trusted
lenders to provide loans that were fairly priced and not designed for
default. A fair number of lenders broke trust with borrowers by
predatory practices and they broke trust with financial markets
through outright fraud as they offered their defective mortgage-backed
securities around the world. 190 Some borrowers were party to the
fraud, and the entire securitization debacle reduced trust in financial
institutions at an international level.
Who is to police the trust obligation? Legislators are captives of
the interests that are causing the problem. Courts are too conservative
to act boldly, claiming that legislatures are the proper body to make
corrective rules. Lenders have been so schooled in neoclassical
economic theory that morality does not stand in the way of employing
legal strategies to bilk people who know little and have little choice,
189. Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Effecting Responsibility in the Mortgage Broker-
Borrower Relationship: A Role for Agency Principles in Predatory Lending
Regulations, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1471, 1517-19 (2005) (arguing to impose duties on
mortgage brokers as if the broker were agent and the borrower the principal). The
level of actual trust should justify application of Restatement section 161(d),
requiring disclosure where a relationship of trust and confidence exists.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(d) (1981).
190. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 61, at 4 ("These include,
among other things, charging excessive fees and interest rates, lending without
regard to borrowers' ability to repay, refinancing borrowers' loans repeatedly over a
short period of time without any economic gain for the borrower... and committing
outright fraud or deception-for example, falsifying documents or intentionally
misinforming borrowers about the terms of a loan."); see Linda S. Finley, Here's a
Subprime Primer: How Did the Mortgage Lending Community Fall Apart? Many
Are to Blame, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007, at 37 ("The FBI reports that mortgage
fraud is the country's fastest-growing white-collar crime .... More damaging.., is
'fraud for profit,' where real estate scam artists take advantage of modern
underwriting standards with lax review thresholds. Fraud for profit makes up about
80 percent of the total number of reported mortgage fraud cases .... ").
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but are treated as hard-bargaining, rational market participants.' 9' A
call for return to some sort of conventional morality may assume too
much-that there ever was a moral structure that reined in pure
greed. 192
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The first part of this article pulled a number out of the air and
suggested that deficiency liability from subprime foreclosures might
run forty billion dollars. The subprime issues are far more complex
than deficiency judgments vel non, and nonrecourse characterization
of home mortgages may be more significant for prime borrowers who
have more assets at risk than subprime borrowers. But as the
dominoes fall on the real estate finance and sales industries, receivers
and trustees in bankruptcy may be obliged to pursue all potential
assets to satisfy creditors.' 93 So what is to be done?
Preserving trust as a public good requires that the entire legal
system, courts as well as legislatures, increase supervision over
unbalanced transactions to be sure the transaction itself is fair. Law
may be described as an autopoietic' 94 system that moves through time,
reinforces practices that replicate from day to day, changes
191. See Havard, supra note 60, at 271 ("One way of defining economic justice
is by looking to institutional economics and its focus on the relationship of
institutions to individuals. Because neoclassical economics values efficiency, it
focuses on the actions and choices of the individual. The notion of the individual's
rational choice obliterates any inquiry into whether the transaction is just or fair.").
192. For a more optimistic view, see Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, Public Reason as a
Public Good, 4 J. L. Soc'Y 217 (2003).
193. Securitization of subprime and prime mortgages caused part of the
problem, and makes the future even more uncertain as to matters such as pursuit of
deficiencies. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 154, at 2078-79.
194. Galit A. Sarfaty, International Norm Diffusion in the Pimicikamak Cree
Nation: A Model of Legal Mediation, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 441, 448 (2007).
According to Gunther Teubner, legal pluralism is no longer "a set of
conflicting social norms but ... a multiplicity of diverse communicative
processes in a given social field that observe social action under the binary
code of legal/illegal." Teubner focuses on the symbolic systems inscribed
in legal orders. He extends Moore's notion of law as process as he
describes the legal system as an autopoietic system of interwoven domains
and circular relations continually being modified.
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incrementally, and moves on. It is the system itself that is wrong about
recourse liability in home mortgage transactions. Those individuals
who participate in the game of law from time to time as lawyers,
judges, legislators, borrowers, and lenders, are for the most part
decent, moral human beings who play their roles honestly and
competently. They do not choose to be oppressive, fraudulent, or
cruel. Few people who work in the lenders' offices know what the
documents say or mean in lawspeak. Few judges think or look beyond
the traditional rule when entering judgment. Few real estate lawyers
challenge it, knowing the challenge is likely to fail.
A single court's declaration that standard mortgage documents are
ambiguous or misleading on account of concealment will not avert
forty billion dollars worth of misery. Abstract rules of law do not have
much effect on real people's lives if they have to be researched,
argued, and applied in individual lawsuits where expensive lawyers
have to represent individual borrowers in cases where the amount in
controversy may not equal the lawyer's fee.
Lenders are not going to give up their ten cents worth of
deficiency advantage, no matter how many dollars it costs hapless
borrowers. Some sort of automatic class protection is indicated. Public
choice theory paints a dismal picture of legislative (in)action in a
world where lenders can use their political and economic power to
convince legislators to leave current rules intact. 195 Retroactive
legislation that changes the legal relations of parties may invoke
constitutional problems. The Uniform Acts that would prospectively
eliminate personal liability for deficiency after home mortgage
foreclosure have not been widely adopted, 196 and few states have
195. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 283 (1962).
In large political units the institutional manifestation of the active
promotion of economic interest is the pressure group .... In the face of
observable pressure-group activity with its demonstrable results on the
outcome of specific issues presented and debated in legislative assemblies,
the behavioral premise that calls for the legislator to follow a selfless
pursuit of the "public interest" or the "general welfare" as something
independent of and apart from private economic interest is severely
threatened.
Id.
196. See Freyermuth, supra note 185, at 1207.
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followed the lead of the antideficiency states in recent years.'9 7 The
beauty of the common law is that a decision can be made that departs
from the past with the assertion that the law itself has not changed, but
the application to the particular case produces an unexpected result.
The law of recourse obligation would remain the same. But the
particular documents would simply be interpreted as nonrecourse. To
have substantial effect on lenders, a class action would be required.
Class action lawsuits brought on behalf of borrowers would be
problematic, but possible. Some class actions against predatory
lenders have been brought and settled short of trial. 198 To accomplish
institutional change, such suits should not stop with settlement,
however tempting the terms might be for attorneys seeking to pay
their own rent. In particular, any settlement that sets aside money for
disclosure 99 or "education" for borrowers is useless. 200  The
197. Only nine states have any kind of antideficiency statutes: Alaska, ALASKA
STAT. § 34.20.100 (2006); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-729A (2007);
California, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b), (d) (West 2006); Idaho, IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 45-1512 (2003); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 582.30 (West 2000); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-21.38 (West 2007); North Dakota, N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-19-03 (Supp. 2007); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.10 (West
2004); and Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 86.770(2) (2007).
198. See, e.g., Faten Sabry & Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown:
Not Again!, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 41, 45 (2007) (listing four borrower versus
lender subprime lawsuits); see also Office of the Att'y Gen., State of Cal., Attorney
General Lockyer Announces $325 Million Dollar Settlement with Ameriquest to
Resolve National Predatory Lending Case, Jan. 23, 2006,
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id= 1254&year=2006&month= 1 [hereinafter
California Predatory Lending Settlement] ("The agreement ranks as the second-
largest predatory lending settlement in history, right behind the $484 million
agreement reached between most states and Household Finance Corporation in
2002.").
199. See, e.g., California Predatory Lending Settlement, supra note 198
("[T]he settlement requires full, clear disclosure regarding interest rates, discount
points, prepayment penalties and other loan or refinancing terms."). There was no
mention of disclosure of deficiency liability.
200. See, e.g., id. ("[T]he settlement requires Ameriquest to pay $30 million to
the settling states to cover their costs, and to fund consumer education and
enforcement programs."); see also PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW
AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, COUNTRYWIDE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT (UNSIGNED) 159, 164-65 (2007) (detailing an education program for
Countrywide to follow, but nowhere mentioning disclosure of the possibility of
deficiency).
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limitations of the human brain are such that we might as well burn the
money as add another disclosure statement at closing. 201 A successful
class action against the major secondary market purchasers and
mortgage insurers for declaratory judgment that standard mortgage
documents are nonrecourse might establish a nationwide rule of law
that would be honored as to other mortgagees and secondary market
purchasers. The burden is on lawyers and judges to change the system.
This article ends with a call for individual trial judges to declare
that the most familiar mortgage documents create nonrecourse debt,
thereby forcing appellate courts to face the issue whether home
mortgage deficiencies are based on consent or fiat.20 2 If fiat, it is
unfair and should be nullified. Today, the liability is fiat, pure and
simple. Carl Sandburg gets the last word:
The work of a bricklayer goes to the blue.
The knack of a mason outlasts a moon.
The hands of a plasterer hold a room together.
The land of a farmer wishes him back again.
Singers of songs and dreamers of plays
Build a house no wind blows over.
The lawyers-tell me why a hearse horse snickers
hauling a lawyer's bones.
20 3
Carl Sandburg (1878-1967)
201. Burlingame, supra note 11, at 480-82; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 61, at 13.
GAO review of literature and interviews with consumer and federal
officials suggest that consumer education by itself has limits as a tool for
deterring predatory lending. First, mortgage loans are complex financial
transactions, and many different factors-including the interest rate, fees,
provisions of the loan, and situation of the borrower-determine whether a
loan is in the borrower's best interests.
Id. No mention is made of the potentiality of deficiency liability after foreclosure.
202. Leonard Kaplan, a former colleague and legal activist, said of all possible
jobs he would most like to be a federal district judge. With life tenure, he could
decide cases in a way that would force appellate courts to face social issues that are
ordinarily masked by "correct" holdings by obedient trial courts.
203. SANDBURG, supra note 1, at 86.
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